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Introduction 
 
In August 2016, Japan’s Ministry of Defense in its annual defence white paper1, expressed its 
concern over China’s increasing assertiveness in matters regarding the maritime domain: 
“While advocating “peaceful development,” China, particularly over maritime issues where its 
interests conflict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, including attempts at changing 
the status quo by coercion based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing order of 
international law.”2 
Similarly, the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) published a 
National Defence Report in 2015, in which it stated that 
“[i]n the past 2 years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been continuously increasing its 
military strength and attempting to break through the current US-led Asia Pacific security framework 
by efforts such as establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and expanding 
island reclamation in the South China Sea.[…] Hence, the PRC remains the greatest threat to our 
national security, tilts regional military balance, and poses a grave challenge to the regional stability.”3 
 
It appears that certain states in the Asia-Pacific region have deemed it necessary to publically express 
their concern regarding particular behaviour of the Chinese navy, in the broader context of China’s 
rise on the world stage, and its military modernisation, thus taking a clear position in the debate on 
the nature of China’s development. 
In this study, the debate on the nature of China’s development in the Asia-Pacific region will 
be examined from a specific angle: by answering the question how China’s naval modernisation is 
officially perceived and reacted upon in the respective defence white papers of regional actors, it will 
provide a nuanced view on the advocated peacefulness of that development.  
The general question posed above invokes several other questions, the first of which would 
be what exactly constitutes the behaviour that is the subject of discussion, and how this (naval) 
behaviour is related to China’s development. 
                                                          
1 White papers exist in various forms, most of which outline plans for future policy in a certain sector by a 
business or government. So, in order to avoid confusion, in this paper, a white paper will be taken to mean an 
official government document that outlines future policy on matters of national defence. 
2 Government of Japan, Defense of Japan 2016 (Ministry of Defense 2016) 41 
<http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2016.html> [accessed 14 December 2017]. 
3 Republic of China, National Defense Report 2015 (Ministry of National Defense 2015) 20 
<https://china.usc.edu/republic-china-taiwan-national-defense-report-2015> [accessed 18 April 2018]. 
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 A second (group of) questions that the expressions quoted above invoke, is whether these 
are an isolated occurrence. Have they been communicated only once, or more often? Are they a 
reaction to a certain incident that involved China, Japan, and Taiwan, or are there other reasons 
underlying these expressions? And are there more actors in the region that have communicated their 
worries regarding this issue in their respective defence white papers? And if so, what rhetoric did 
they use? How do these actors perceive the developments in the Chinese navy, and in its behaviour? 
And, given the fact that various actors have regularly published defence white papers over the years, 
whether or not the most recent perception differs from earlier analyses.  
 A final question that can be asked when reading these concerns, pertains to how the national 
perspectives differ from each other, and how they are similar in their rhetoric regarding the Chinese 
naval expansion. This also includes important themes that come back throughout the various 
defence white papers, which hint at regional hot issues. 
Especially since, looking back in its long history, China’s relation to the sea has been 
ambiguous, it is important to investigate this ongoing Chinese naval modernisation right now. It is 
necessary to answer the question whether China’s development from the late 1970s onwards, and 
the modernisation of its armed forces, in particular its naval forces, have altered (or, are still altering) 
China’s relation to the sea. Historically, as will be discussed in chapter 1, China has not put the focus 
of its attention to the sea, notwithstanding a few exceptions. For example: during the reign of the 
Yongle Emperor (r. 1402-1424, Ming dynasty), the Chinese admiral Zheng He sailed with a grand fleet 
to Africa, even reaching Mecca and Mogadishu. However, most of its history China has put its 
attention primarily to land. Indeed, several Emperors issued a ‘sea ban’ as a national defence against 
pirates, or to try and maintain control over trade with foreigners. And during the Mao Zedong period, 
when most attention was paid to the divisions of the army based on land in order to be able to 
defend China against a Soviet invasion, the navy was neglected. Now that China has more or less 
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stabilized its borders in the post-1989 era4, it has the possibility to invest in its navy again, as is stated 
in the 2006 white paper: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy is developing to become a modern 
maritime force, by investing in maritime information systems and “new-generation” naval 
equipment.5   
 Next to this possible diverging of China’s historical trend of focussing on land rather than on 
sea, it is also important to study the reactions of actors in the region to this development, not only to 
better understand various ongoing maritime disputes in the (South)East-Asian region, such as the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, the Taiwan issue, and the South China Sea conflict, but also to be 
able to pinpoint possible sources of political tension on both a bilateral and multilateral scale. For 
example, the expansion of the Chinese naval forces may be seen as threatening the current position 
of the United States as hegemon on the world’s oceans, and in particular to its policies regarding the 
Asia-Pacific area.  
 In order to provide a nuanced view to the advocated peacefulness of China’s development, 
this study will answer the three (groups of) questions that have been posed above. Therefore, 
following the introduction, this study will be geographically structured. Chapter 1 will focus on China, 
chapter 2 on the nations that border the East China Sea, chapter 3 on various nations that border the 
South China Sea6, and the subject of chapter 4 will be the United States. The first question will be 
dealt with in chapter 1, which will put the Chinese naval modernisation in the broader picture of 
Chinese naval history and China’s maritime security strategy, thus providing the rationale for the 
behaviour that the PLA Navy displays. The second group of questions forms the subject of the 
chapters 2, 3, and 4, and the following actors will be considered: South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan in 
chapter 2, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam in chapter 3, and the United States in 
                                                          
4 Mainly by settling various disputes about border territories with its neighbours, but also by making 
improvements to its road and railway infrastructure, which allow China to assert and consolidate control of its 
border areas. 
5People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2006 (Ministry of National Defense 2006) Chapter IV 
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm> [accessed 13 March 2018]. 
6 Taiwan borders both the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In this study it will be discussed in chapter 2. 
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chapter 4. By studying their respective defence white papers7, to determine whether or not they 
voiced their concern regarding China’s behaviour in maritime matters, followed by an analysis of 
these comments or the lack thereof. The conclusion, in answering the third question, will highlight 
recurring themes as well as differences between various nations that have become visible 
throughout the chapters, and come back to the bigger picture of the nature of China’s rise in order to 
draw a conclusion. 
  
The debate on China’s rise 
 
In the almost 40 years that have come to pass since 1978, China has changed considerably and 
consequently has its position in the Asia-Pacific region and worldwide. After decades of struggling 
under the “chains of its planned economy”8, Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 economic reforms started to open 
up China’s market to the rest of the world. Since then China has achieved extraordinary economic 
growth, at times a double-digit annual increase in GDP. Arguably, it is this growth that has thrust 
China into its emergence as a global power: ‘China’s rise’. The term itself however, has never been 
defined in such a way that its definition was commonly accepted. Most definitions take demographic, 
economic, and military growth into account.9 Other analyses focus on a more “nimble and engaging” 
Chinese foreign policy,10 or find the essence of China’s rise in self-salvation and self-renewal.11 
                                                          
7 Or equivalent documents, in the case of the United States. 
8 C. Fred Bergsten et al., China’s rise : challenges and opportunities (Washington, DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute 
for International Economics 2009) 3. 
9 See e.g. Jun Niu, ‘“China’s Rise”: Between Dream and Reality. (“中国崛起”:梦想与现实之间的思考).’, 
International Economic Review (国际经济评论) 6 (2003) 45–47.;  
Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross ed., Engaging China : The Management of an Emerging Power (London: 
Routledge 1999) xi.; Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘The Rise of China’, Foreign Affairs 72:5 (1993) 59–74. 
10  Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s New Diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs 82:6 (2003) 22–35, 23. 
11  Dai Bingguo, qtd. in Jianwei Wang, ‘The Discourse on China’s Rise’, China: An International Journal 15:1 
(2017) 24–40,  25. “Self-salvation and self-renewal” is Wang’s translation of the Chinese phrase自救与复兴 
(zijiu yu fuxing). Another translation could be “self-help and revival”. 
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Whereas in the early stages of the debate the main question was whether China was rising 
and/or would continue to rise, later on the question changed to how China would rise.12 Already in 
1993, just a few years after the emergence of the debate, Nicholas Kristof, who was Beijing Bureau 
Chief for The New York Times between 1988 and 1993, concluded that China is “an ambitious nation 
that is becoming the behemoth in the neighborhood”.13 It is this ‘ambition’, as mentioned by Kristof, 
which has created a schism in the discourse on China’s rise: on the one hand there are those who 
view China’s rise as a threat to international stability, and on the other hand there are those who 
adhere to the theory of a peaceful rise. 14 Expressions of international concerns about the possible 
negative implications of China’s development can be summarized as the “China threat theory”. One 
of the earliest proponents of this theory was Ross Munro, then coordinator of the Asia Program at 
the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, who in 1992 published an article called 
‘Awakening Dragon: The Real Danger in Asia is from China’, in which he argued that with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union the shared concerns about its expansionism (the “essential glue of [the] 
relationship”15 between China and the United States) have fallen away, and that the challenge in 
U.S.-China relations lies in “the fundamental conflict between the security interests of the two 
nations”.16 His argument is primarily ideological in nature, and as such it is part of the first post-Cold 
War wave of the “China threat theory”, which saw the incompatibility of China’s ideology with 
democracy as threatening. The second wave had to do with the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96, 
and the Chinese military muscle-flexing in this conflict, whereas the third wave was concerned with 
China’s growing economic influence following the Asian financial crisis of 1997. In the latest wave of 
                                                          
12  Shaun Breslin, ‘Still rising or risen (or both)? Why and how China matters’, The Pacific Review 30:6 (2017) 
870–884, 876; Wang, ‘The Discourse on China’s Rise’ (2017). 
13  Kristof, ‘The Rise of China’, 74. 
14 For an overview of the major arguments of both sides see e.g. Denny Roy, ‘The “China Threat” Issue: Major 
Arguments’, Asian Survey 36:8 (1996) 758–771 <doi:10.2307/2645437>. See also Richard Bernstein and Ross H. 
Munro, ‘The Coming Conflict with America’, Foreign Affairs 76:2 (1997) 18–32. 
15  Ross Munro, ‘Awakening Dragon: The Real Danger in Asia Is from China’, Policy Review 62 (1992) 10–16, 11. 
16  Ibid., 16.  
8 
 
the “China threat theory”, the debate focuses on contemporary issues such as cyber, food, and 
environmental security.17 
The opposite side of the coin of the “China threat theory” is the “China’s responsibility theory”, 
or “theory of peaceful rise”. To be sure, both theories existed at the same time, but “China’s 
responsibility” has for a long time been overshadowed by “China threat”. Jin Canrong, professor of 
International Relations at the Chinese People’s University and specialist on Sino-US relations and 
Chinese foreign policy, argues that only when the second Bush administration altered its policy 
towards China, other countries did so too, which brought the “China’s responsibility theory” in the 
spotlight.18 This theory highlights the peaceful nature of China’s rise to great power status. The 
premise of this theory is that, in contrast with the rise of other great powers in history, China’s rise 
will be peaceful: “a historically unique opportunity.”19  
The altered international perception of the rise of China was not solely the effort of the second 
Bush administration: the Chinese themselves were, and still are, actively involved in the process. 
They understood that when the “China threat theory” was not addressed properly and adequately, 
the international community might not perceive China’s rise very well. To that end, around 2002, 
Chinese foreign policy started to underline the peacefulness of China’s rise. The first and most 
prominent advocate of this policy was Zheng Bijian, a close associate of former president Hu Jintao. 
In a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies of the U.S. in 2002 he mentions that, 
in order to meet China’s development targets, China’s foreign cooperation will “be in tandem with 
economic globalization instead of in isolation from it”. While rising, China has not, and will not, 
                                                          
17  Canrong Jin, ‘From “China Threat” to “China’s Responsibility”: Changing International Discourse on China 
and China’s Response’, in: Herbert S. Yee ed., China’s Rise - Threat or Opportunity? (New York: Routledge 2011) 
270–279, 271. 
For a specific example of the debate on cyber security, see also: Joel Brenner and Jon R. Lindsay, ‘Debating the 
Chinese Cyber Threat’, International Security 40:1 (2015) 191–195. 
For a specific example of the debate on environmental security, see also: Gregory D. Foster, ‘China’s 
environmental threat: Crafting a strategic response’, Comparative Strategy 19:2 (2000) 123–143 
<doi:10.1080/01495930008403204>. 
18  Jin, ‘From “China Threat” to “China’s Responsibility”, 272. 
19  Raviprasad Narayanan, ‘The Chinese Discourse on the ‘Rise of China’’, Strategic Analysis 31:4 (2007) 645–
663, 646. 
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threaten the international system, and as such be different from the rise of Germany in both World 
Wars and the rise of Japan in the Second World War. 20 In this way, i.e. being more open about 
China’s developmental path, Zheng hoped to take away the uneasiness other nations experienced 
when confronted with the emergence of China on the world stage.  
Closely linked to the governmental efforts to be externally perceived as a peaceful nation, were 
the efforts to internally connect with the Chinese population at large by establishing a ‘pro-people’ 
image. The authors of China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities argue that, contrary to popular 
belief, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ability to unilaterally impose its policies throughout the 
whole of China, is limited for a variety of reasons.21 Consequently, policies tend to be guiding 
principles more than hard law. This in turn might be perceived by other nations as an unstable 
relationship between the government and local authorities, and negatively influence their belief in a 
peacefully rising China. In line with the establishment of this ‘pro-people’ image, former president Hu 
Jintao articulated his policy in the “New Three People’s Principles” (新三民主义, xin sanmin zhuyi): 
power to be used by the people, concern to be showed to the people, and benefits to be enjoyed by 
the people;22 and in the “Three Closenesses”: close to the people, close to reality, and close to life.23 
Perhaps, in this way, the Chinese government hoped to show the world its ability to peacefully 
implement policies throughout the nation, and to prove its centre-local relations to be stable. 
  In another attempt to curb fear for a rising China in neighbouring countries, the word ‘rise’ 
(崛起, jueqi), which was deemed too strong, was replaced with ‘development’ (发展, fazhan), which 
                                                          
20  Bijian Zheng, The 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and China’s Peaceful Rise – A New 
Path (Speech, 9 December 2002). 
21 Bergsten et al., China’s rise : challenges and opportunities, 75–79. One of these reasons is e.g. the Chinese 
bureaucratic structure, where various government organisations deal with aspects of the same issue, which 
makes it difficult for local government to correctly implement all regulation that has been issued by these 
organisations. 
22  Narayanan, ‘The Chinese Discourse on the ‘Rise of China’’, 649; Zhengxu Wang and Liang Fook Lye, 
‘Responding to Challenges and Problems of Governance’, in: Gungwu Wang and John Wong ed., Interpreting 
China’s development (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 2007) 3–10, 6. 
23  Narayanan, ‘The Chinese Discourse on the ‘Rise of China’’, 649. 
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has a more positive connotation attached to it.24 Already in a 2005 white paper titled “China’s 
Peaceful Development Road” the term ‘peaceful rise’ was wholly absent, and replaced by ‘peaceful 
development’. Neither of the following 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2015 defence white papers mention 
the words ‘peaceful’ and ‘rise’ together in a sentence, whereas ‘peaceful development’ is a common 
phrase in these documents.  
 Next to the themes of whether or not China has been rising, and how China will rise, another 
segment of the literature on China’s rise deals with the question when China will have risen, and the 
criteria that might measure such an accomplishment. Bergsten et al. emphasise the complexity and 
uniqueness of this case in three senses: (1) China’s per capita income is, with $300025, significantly 
less than those of Western powers, (2) the Chinese government still has a considerable influence on 
the domestic economy, and (3) China is not a democracy.26 When looking at the matter in this 
‘traditional’ sense, in order to be able to claim to have risen, China should address income inequality, 
release its stark grip on the domestic market, and become a democracy. Others however, find China 
to be successful in different areas, such as in contributing to global science and technology, which 
“will prove to be a significant event […]”27, or in the role China plays in the international system. 
Yongjin Zhang, Professor of International Politics at the University of Bristol, points out China’s arrival 
as “the second among equals in the Great Power club”28, a status that means that China’s influence 
in “constructing the institutional and normative architecture of global governance” is rivalled only by 
                                                          
24 Wang, ‘The Discourse on China’s Rise’, 29–30; Raviprasad Narayanan, ‘The Chinese Discourse on the ‘Rise of 
China’’’’, 650–651. 
25 China’s GPD per capita was $3000 in 2008, when China’s rise was published. In 2016 the GDP per capita was 
around $8100-8200, according to data from the World Bank. 
(https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN). This is still significantly less than the 
GDP per capita of Western powers. 
26 Bergsten et al., China’s rise : challenges and opportunities, 10–11. 
27 Yu Xie, Chunni Zhang and Qing Lai, ‘China’s rise as a major contributor to science and technology’, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111:26 (2014) 9437–9442, 
9441. 
28 Yongjin Zhang, ‘China and liberal hierarchies in global international society: power and negotiation for 
normative change’, International Affairs 92:4 (2016) 795–816, 797. 
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the United States, and at the same time indicates the entanglement of China in the international 
order. 29  
The complexity of the debate on China’s rise is aptly summarised by Shaun Breslin, Professor of 
Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, and co-editor of The Pacific Review: 
“Perhaps it is time to stop talking of China as rising, and accepting that while its journey is far from 
over, in many respects it is already risen”30.  
However, in studying the nature of China’s rise, the literature usually makes use of certain 
features of that rise, such as economic growth, political power etc., from which a conclusion 
regarding the peacefulness is drawn. Missing in the debate is, arguably, a study that analyses how 
China’s development is officially perceived by neighbouring nations, seen the fact that it is explicitly 
China’s intention to be perceived as rising peacefully, regardless of whether it is or is not. And in 
comparing these reactions, by using a primary source with the same characteristics for each of these 
actors, it will become clear whether these Chinese efforts have the intended result. 
 
Limitations 
 
The use of white papers as primary sources in this study has both its merits and its pitfalls. The fact 
that these documents have been published by their respective governments means that the wording 
has been carefully weighed by the responsible departments, in order not to be outright provocative 
to other nations in any sense. They convey the message that not only the defence department, but 
the government as a whole wants to be heard. This could be, on the other hand, misleading as well. 
If the government does not want to give all the information it has at its disposal (which is almost 
certainly the case), it does not have to. At the same time, this makes the information that is 
published, even more interesting. Even so, white papers by definition are not representative for the 
standpoint of the nation as a whole. Digressing opinions are published in newspapers, magazines, on 
                                                          
29 Ibid., 811.  
30 Breslin, ‘Still rising or risen (or both)?’, 879. 
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the internet, or elsewhere. These public opinions will not be taken into account here, because the 
focus here is on official, government published documents, given that governments are the main 
intended recipients of China’s efforts to advocate its rise as being peaceful. 
Another aspect that needs to be taken into account when studying white papers, is their 
topicality. Within just a few years, they tend to be outdated and replaced by a newer version. Next to 
that, some of the older ones represent the viewpoints of previous governments, which might differ 
greatly from the standpoints of the current one. The main reason in this study to use white papers as 
primary sources is that their contents are not advisory, but contain actual policy that is being, or has 
been, put into practice. 
 The time period that will be analysed in this study starts in December 2004, and ends in 
March 2018. Although the modernization of the Chinese navy began already in the 1980s after Mao 
Zedong’s death, it was only in December 2004, with the publishing of the fourth Chinese white paper, 
which outlines China’s national defence strategy, that the government explicitly introduced the navy 
as being a priority in the development of its army’s operational strength. It is for this reason that, in 
examining the reasons behind China’s behaviour in maritime matters, the pre-2004 developments 
will only briefly be examined, whereas the main focus will be on the post-2004 naval expansion. The 
most recent white paper used in this study was published in March 2018. However, the maritime 
disputes that have been mentioned above are still unfolding, which is why a few comments regarding 
events later than March 2018 have not been left out. 
 Of each of these actors will be determined whether or not they voiced their concern 
regarding China’s assertiveness in maritime matters in their respective white papers, and if so, this 
will be followed by an analysis of the rhetoric used to do so. This rhetoric in turn will be compared to 
the rhetoric of earlier white papers, to determine how the national perspective has evolved over 
time. 
13 
 
 The actors that have been considered in this study (except for the United States) are selected 
by the following criteria: they must be geographically located within the first island chain31, an area 
that is important in the first phase of China’s national security strategy, and they must be involved in 
a maritime dispute with China. Adhering to these criteria means that South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam will be considered below. The United States meets 
neither of the criteria, but as the current world power, which is also heavily militarily present in the 
Asia-Pacific region, and is allied with several Asian nations, it might feel challenged by China’s military 
development, making it necessary to analyse the perception of the United States as well. 
 Still, there are certain actors in the region that will not or cannot be considered here, for 
varying reasons: The Russian Federation has not been included in this study, for as of 2008 all border 
disputes between China and Russia have been settled, and next to that no official English translation 
of the Russian white papers is available. North Korea has not been included because it does not 
officially publish white papers or equivalent documents. Neither has Indonesia been included, 
because it has not published any post-2004 defence white papers, its only one dates from 2003. 
                                                          
31 The first island chain, seen from the perspective of China, stretches from the Kuril Islands, through Japan, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, to Indonesia. See chapter 1 for the place of this chain in the Chinese naval strategic 
framework. 
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Chapter 1 – Chinese Naval Modernisation 
 
An important manifestation of the ambit of China’s rise, next to an increased entanglement in the 
world economic system and global affairs, is to be found in its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its 
various branches. Though anno 2017 China has the largest army in the world, (approximately 2.3 
million troops), it is not the amount of troops that showcase China’s rise. In fact, this number has 
dropped from more than 3.0 million in 1990.32 Rather it is the profound transformation that the army 
itself has undergone. The structural changes in its management and mission, as well as the 
modernisation of its equipment are the genuine indicator of China’s changing role in the 
international system.  
 This chapter will shortly explore the Chinese naval history prior to the 1980s, and more 
broadly the modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) since then, in order to 
provide context to the analysis of Chinese behaviour in maritime matters, that have pressed various 
governments to express their concerns, as has been established in the introduction. 
 
Chinese Naval History 
 
In its long history, except for a short period during the Ming (1368-1644) dynasty, China has put its 
primary focus of attention to land, rather than to sea.33 In the first place, historically, the biggest 
threats to the ruling dynasties have come from the Chinese mainland, or from the steppes in the 
north. Most of these dynasties were succeeded by a dynasty that sprung from within the ethnic 
group of Han Chinese. Exceptions are the so-called ‘conquest dynasties’ Yuan (1271-1368) and Qing 
                                                          
32 Michael S. Chase et al., China’s incomplete military transformation: assessing the weaknesses of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) (Rand Corporation 2015) 53–54. 
33 Viz. Bernard D. Cole, Asian maritime strategies : navigating troubled waters (Annapolis, Maryland : Naval 
Institute Press 2013) 92. 
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(1644-1911), of which the rulers were not of Han descent.34 The Yuan dynasty consisted of Mongol 
nomadic tribes from the north and west, and the Qing were of Manchu descent, an ethnic minority in 
the north of contemporary China. In order to keep control within the empire, and to fend off 
invaders, large standing armies have been an integral part of Chinese military history; as has been 
the Great Wall of China, which has been built on from the 7th century B.C. onwards until the Qing 
dynasty. The main purpose of the Wall, with its many sections stretching well over 21.000 km, was to 
keep those north of it out. The second reason why China has put its primary focus of attention to 
land, is the notion of Sinocentrism. In its pre-modern manifestation, this worldview had China at its 
centre, as the most advanced civilization, and classifies the nations around it in various categories of 
being uncivilised, usually based on proximity to the Chinese core. In accordance with this worldview, 
it was not necessary to develop e.g. a sophisticated maritime expeditionary force, because the 
further one would get away from China, the less civilised people would be, having nothing to 
contribute to the prosperity of the centre of the world. 
This does not mean that the Chinese do not have a maritime history, on the contrary. But as has 
been argued by Zheng Yangwen, professor of Chinese history at the University of Manchester, in her 
book China on the Sea: How the Maritime World Shaped Modern China, this part of China’s history 
has been “unduly neglected”.35 The best known episode in the maritime history of China have been 
the Zheng He voyages (1405-1433), which ultimately reached present-day Somalia and Saudi Arabia, 
whereas lesser known examples include the well-developed overseas trade during the Sui and Tang 
dynasties (581-907 A.D.), and the establishment for the first time in China of a permanent national 
navy during the Song dynasty (960-1279 A.D.). 36 Had nations to the east and west, separated from 
                                                          
34 Whether or not the Liao (907-1125) and Jurchen Jin (1115-1234) belonged to these ‘conquest dynasties’ is 
debated. See e.g. Jing-shen Tao, The Jurchen in twelfth-century China : a study of sinicization (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press 1976). 
35 Yangwen Zheng, China on the sea : how the maritime world shaped modern China (Leiden: Brill 2012) 1–7. 
See also Jung-pang Lo, China as a sea power, 1127-1368 : a preliminary survey of the maritime expansion and 
naval exploits of the Chinese people during the Southern Song and Yuan periods (Singapore : NUS Press 2012) 
xv. 
36 Bernard D. Cole, ‘The History of the Twenty-First-Century Chinese Navy’, Naval War College Review 67:3 
(2014) 43–62, 44–45. 
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China by sea rather than sharing a direct border, challenged the dynasties in the same way the 
nomadic tribes in the north and west did, China might have controlled the seas, instead of the Asian 
landmass, Zheng argues.37 
However, these nations did not challenge China in such a way, and in the second half of the 19th 
century, China’s defensive attitude in maritime affairs at the time proved to be calamitous. During 
the Second Opium War (1856-1860), the Chinese junks were no match for the modern European 
warships. Although this wake-up call prompted the Qing to buy modern ships in Britain and Germany 
in the 1870s, and to establish an Imperial Chinese Navy in 1875, which consisted of four fleets based 
along the coast of China, the Qing navy suffered crushing defeats in various wars in the 1880s and 
1890s. The Fujian Fleet, based from Fuzhou, was nearly annihilated during the Sino-French War 
(1883-1885) by a French fleet about half its size, whereas the Beiyang Fleet, based from Weihaiwei, 
was destroyed in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Bernard Cole, professor of maritime 
strategy at the National War College, argues that one of the factors that resulted in this failed 
attempt to establish a modern navy, was the lack of a coherent maritime objective.38 Other than to 
help defend troops based on land against possible invaders, the Imperial Chinese Navy did not have a 
clear objective. This defensive attitude towards the naval objectives of China continued well into the 
20th century. Following the abdication of the Qing Emperor in 1912, the fleets of the Imperial Chinese 
Navy were replaced with the Republic of China Navy (ROCN), which remained loyal to Sun Yat-sen’s 
Kuomintang, and as such was the predecessor to Taiwan’s modern-day ROC Navy. When in 1949 the 
Chinese nationalist government was exiled to Taiwan, and Mao Zedong founded the People’s 
Republic of China on the mainland, a new navy was established in May 1950 as a branch of the PLA, 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), partly formed with ships that had defected from the 
ROCN.39 
                                                          
37 Zheng, China on the sea, 7. 
38 Cole, ‘The History of the Twenty-First-Century Chinese Navy’, 48. 
39 Gene Z. Hanrahan, ‘Report on Red China’s New Navy’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 79:8 (1953) 847–854, 
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While initially this PLA Navy struggled with many problems, such as an inexperienced leadership, 
lack of training, facilities and ships, and lack of money due to the Korean War (1950-1953), by the 
1960s it was able to fulfil its objective as a coastal-defence force. Due to global events in the next 
two decades, most prominent among them a re-emerging Soviet threat, in combination with 
domestic upheaval in the form of the “Great Leap Forward” (大跃进, da yuejin) of 1958-1961, and in 
particular the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976, modernisation of the PLA Navy was not at all a 
priority. In fact, the “revolutionary fervor of soldiers imbued with Mao’s ideology” was valued above 
technological advancements.40 In the post-Mao era, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping from 
1978 onwards, initially the PLAN objective was still limited to coastal defence, but following China’s 
opening up to the rest of the world, and its economic advancement, more resources became 
available to be diverted to the development of a modern navy. However, it was not only monetary 
resources that played a role in this development; three other prominent factors are mentioned by 
Cole.41 The first is China’s decision in 1985 that the Soviet Union’s threat to the country had 
diminished enough for the PLA to change its objective from northern defence to ‘peripheral’, or 
active defence, which includes China’s long coastline and, accordingly, increased the strategic 
importance of the PLA Navy. As will be discussed below, this defence focusses on the direction a 
threat to China’s interests is most likely to originate from. The second factor is Deng Xiaoping’s 1975 
assessment of the military as inadequate to conduct modern warfare, and the third factor is Admiral 
Liu Huaqing, who was instrumental in the 1985 decision mentioned above and developed the 
strategic framework for the PLAN to operate within. 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 Cole, ‘The History of the Twenty-First-Century Chinese Navy’, 53. 
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China’s Naval Strategic Framework 
 
Admiral Liu commanded the PLAN between 1982 and 1987, and was the driving force behind its 
modernisation. In his autobiography42, it becomes clear that the writings of U.S. Navy officer Alfred 
Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) were particularly influential to his views, especially his book The Influence 
of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. Mahan’s understanding of sea power is built on three pillars: 
production, shipping, and colonies.43 Production is necessary for the creation of supply and demand, 
which causes trade; shipping is necessary to transport those goods; and colonies create markets 
overseas and provide points of safety for ships. Thus, sea power combines both a country’s naval 
power in its military sense, and its commercial activities. In times of war, as well as in times of peace, 
security and undisturbed economic activities in the maritime arena were of paramount importance 
to the prosperity of a nation, concluded Mahan.44 To ensure such a situation, it is necessary to have 
an overbearing naval power vis-à-vis any potential economic competitor, or enemy. 
The six principal conditions that Mahan determined to affect the sea power of a nation45, i.e. the 
geographical position of the nation; the physical conformation of its coastal features and climate; the 
extent of its territory; the number of its population; the character of its people; and the character of 
its government and institutions, are different depending on the nation, which leads to a difference in 
the interpretation of his theory, as has been established by a case study involving Imperial Germany 
and Imperial Japan.46 The first was quite disadvantaged by its geographical position, more or less 
locked in by the British Royal Navy, whereas the second is an island chain. These geographic realities 
were one of the many factors which had to be taken into account, and modified into a local version 
of sea power theory.  
                                                          
42 Liu’s memoir is discussed in James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st 
Century: The Turn to Mahan (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2008) 28–34. 
43 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The influence of sea power upon history, 1660 - 1783 ([Repr.]; London: Sampson Low, 
Marston and Co. 1918) 28. 
44 See also William Edmund Livezey, Mahan on sea power (Norman : University of Oklahoma Press 1947) 48. 
45 For a more in depth analysis of these conditions, see Mahan, The influence of sea power upon history, 28–88. 
46 Holmes and Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century, 11–26. 
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In the case of China, Admiral Liu Huaqing was a fierce proponent of implementing Mahanian 
theory into the development of a modernised PLA Navy, “hailing [The Influence of Sea Power Upon 
History] as one of the most systematic appraisals ever written of concepts relating to command of 
the sea and naval strategy”.47 Following a series of conferences in the early 1980s in which Liu 
introduced his vision and argued for a Chinese naval strategic framework, thus diverting from China’s 
traditional continental outlook, his maritime strategy was announced in December 1985, shifting 
away from a policy of coastal defence to one of offshore defence, i.e. from assisting the PLA in 
defending the nation, to safeguarding the maritime area encompassing roughly the Yellow, East 
China, and South China Seas. Key to this strategy was that the PLA Navy had to become a strategic 
service independent from the PLA, with its own objectives, though not separated from the national 
security strategy. Aiming at being able by the year 2010 to defend China’s security interests within 
the first island chain, stretching from the Kuril Island through Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the 
Philippines, to Indonesia, was phase I of this strategy. Phase II, to be realised by 2020, encompasses 
the second island chain, from the Kurils through Japan, the Mariana Islands and Palau, and Indonesia, 
including Java and the Malacca strait. Finally by 2050, the PLAN having the capabilities in defending 
Chinese interests on a Pan-Pacific level, or even global scale, which includes the possession of aircraft 
carriers, is phase III.48  
Having a strategic framework to operate within, the PLA Navy modernisation program during the 
1980s progressed steadily and deliberate, mixing indigenous construction, foreign purchases, and 
reverse engineering.49 Though strained by the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, and the ensuing 
massacre of protesters, which lead to Western economic sanctions and an arms embargo, (a gap that 
Russia was quick to fill up, continuing until today), modernisation continued at a measured pace. It 
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was only in 1993, argued senior international/defence researcher at the RAND Corporation50 Cortez 
Cooper in a testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in June 
2009, that former president Jiang Zemin’s “Military Guidelines for the New Period” sped up the naval 
modernisation. These guidelines for the PLA in general, are “fundamental military policies” providing 
principles for “planning and guiding the development and utilization of the armed forces”.51 Whereas 
in the first three instances since 1949 that “military guidelines” were issued they had a specific 
adversary in mind, such as the U.S. during the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the Soviets from the 
mid-1960s onwards, this fourth time in 1993 no distinct enemy was indicated. Instead, the PRC 
shifted its attention to the coast as its main strategic direction, meaning to invest in being able to 
counter any threat from that direction.52 As such, China has diverged from its historical trend of 
putting the primary focus of its security attention on land, rather than on sea. 
This threat most likely, in the eyes of the Chinese, comes from Taiwanese formal independence 
from China which, if it escalates into violence, will almost certainly come to involve Taiwan’s allies, 
most notably the U.S. Navy. The simmering conflict has escalated before, most notably during the 
1995-1996 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. After a visit of Taiwan’s president Lee to Cornwell University in 
the United States, the PRC announced and executed missile tests in the waters around Taiwan, 
mobilised forces in the province opposing Taiwan, and conducted exercises within the PLA. 
Nevertheless, it cannot have been only the visit that brought about this display of force; another 
factor that must have played an important role, were the 1996 Taiwan presidential elections (the 
first island-wide democratic election), and the message this display sent to the Taiwanese electorate, 
being that voting for a pro-independence candidate was dangerous. U.S. President Clinton reacted to 
                                                          
50 “The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help 
make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is non-
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51 David M. Finkelstein, ‘China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the “Military Strategic Guidelines”’, 
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This chapter includes a very elaborate discussion of the terminology used by China in its national security 
strategy, as well as a discussion of how the 1993 “Military Guidelines” affected the PLA in general. 
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these Chinese operations by sending two aircraft carrier battle groups to the international waters 
surrounding Taiwan, with one of these groups even sailing through the Taiwan Street. This evoked a 
diplomatic protest from Beijing, but the Taiwanese elections went on, and President Lee won a 54% 
majority of the popular vote.  
Next to the aforementioned change of strategic direction, and Admiral Liu’s strategic framework, 
several more factors spurred the development of a modern Chinese Navy. Firstly, as has been 
established before, adopting the policy of offshore defence meant that the PLAN strategy did not 
break with the traditional continental oriented strategic culture, but instead circumvented it by 
presenting the Navy as a defensive force, instead of an offensive one. In the second place, despite 
the fact that Taiwan has been independently governed from China since 1949, and has even held its 
own democratic elections, China nevertheless favours as one of its key policies a Chinese Unification 
or One China Policy, merging the PRC and ROC to a single sovereign state. In the event of this process 
not developing peacefully, as seemed to be the case in the various Taiwan Street Crises, the PRC will 
need a capable Navy to obtain its strategic objectives, and maybe even to counter a U.S. Navy again 
coming to the aid of Taiwan. The third and fourth factors are interwoven, being to be able to protect 
Chinese interests along the so-called ‘sea lines of communication’ (SLOC), major maritime routes, 
upon which China’s economic growth is becoming increasingly dependent, in both the amount of 
trade that is seaborne, and the imports of oil and gas via these routes.53  
In May 1998, the Information Office of the State Council of China, published a “National Ocean 
Policy of China”, identifying several maritime policies and principles, dealing mostly with creating a 
sustainable use of the ocean. Some of these policies and principles, however, give an insight into 
China’s naval modernisation efforts. Most important in the context of this paper, is the principle of 
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“[s]afeguarding the new international marine order and the state’s marine rights and interests”.54 
Here China is showing its intention to stand up for its own rights, and if the situation asks for it, to 
use the necessary means to enforce its interests. Another interesting one is the enhancement of 
coastal facilities and development of the littoral zones, which includes protection measures, as is the 
promise of international cooperation in maritime affairs in line with international law, most notably 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982. 
 
PLA Navy Force Modernisation 
 
Concretely, for the PLA Navy, the above means that since the 1990s its capability to conduct 
peacetime, as well as wartime missions, has increased in each of the three classes generally used to 
analyse navies, being the surface, subsurface, and aviation classes. The surface division includes e.g. 
‘conventional’ warships, patrol boats, and consists of combatant as well as non-combatant forces. 
The main component of the subsurface division are submarines, both nuclear and conventionally 
powered, whereas the strength of the aviation division lies mainly in its helicopter fleet stationed 
aboard several of its ships. According to Cole, the surface division until around 2006 had been “riding 
on the leading edge of current PLAN modernization”, adding domestically built ships to the fleet 
every year since 2000. 55 Notwithstanding, Ronald O’Rourke, specialist in Naval Affairs for the U.S. 
Congressional Research Service, in a 2014 report to inform members of Congress on Chinese naval 
modernisation, writes that the quantity of vessels is not the main focus of the modernisation efforts. 
Rather, it is the quality of the overall equipment that counts, replacing older vessels by more modern 
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and capable ones.56 This indeed becomes visible from figures in the same report, provided by the U.S. 
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) from 2000, 2005, 2010, and projected for 2015 and 2020.57 The 
total number of the type of ships that is mentioned has not increased significantly. In fact, between 
2000 and 2010, this number has even decreased, from 284 to 277 vessels, due to a decrease in diesel 
attack submarines, amphibious ships, and, most noteworthy, missile-armed coastal patrol craft. At 
the same time, however, the number of destroyers and frigates has gone up, from 21 and 37 
respectively, to 25 and 49 vessels. The projection for 2015 ranges between a total number of 304 and 
329 ships. Most notably is the projected addition of one aircraft carrier, and 20 to 25 corvettes. 
The actual data over 2015, presented by O’Rourke in a 2017 report with the same intention as 
the one above, proves that the estimates were a little too high; the total number of vessels in that 
year was 294, whereas in 2017 it was 317.58 The aircraft carrier had indeed been added to the PLA 
Navy in 2013, refurbished from an ex-Ukrainian carrier bought unfinished in 1998, but the number of 
corvettes was only 15 in 2015. Another aircraft carrier, indigenously built and reportedly named 
Shandong, is in the final stages of its construction, and scheduled to be finished by the end of 2018. 
As has been said before, and must be noted again here, the quantity of vessels is much less the focus 
of the PLAN modernisation efforts than is their quality. The numbers above include “older and less 
capable units – including some of questionable operational status”59, and as such the overall size of 
the (combined) fleet might be misleading. An estimate by ONI in O’Rourke’s 2014 report, states that 
by 2015 approximately 70% of the diesel attack submarines, nuclear-powered attack submarines, 
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destroyers, and frigates would be of modern design.60 The exact same table is published in the 2017 
report, so no new information on the actual data was available.61  
With regard to the subsurface division, modernisation is mainly visible in the speed at which 
submarines are added to the fleet, i.e. more than 40 additions between 1995 and 2013.62 At the 
same time, older classes of submarines are retired or upgraded, meaning that the percentage of 
modern submarine units has gone up from less than 10% in 2000 to 50% in 2009.63 The older classes 
include e.g. the Romeo class diesel-electric submarine, based on Soviet design from the 1950s, 
whereas the modern classes, such as the Yuan class diesel attack submarine, are a product of an 
indigenous design, and even more advanced types are under construction. Taken as a whole, the 
submarine fleet consists of diesel conventional attack (SS), nuclear-powered attack (SSN), and 
(nuclear-powered) ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). The non-ballistic submarine are an important 
asset in the Taiwan situation, as a powerful force against allies of Taiwan coming to its aid, especially 
against aircraft carriers, and as a deterrence force for the area within the first island chain.64 The 
purpose of the SSBN’s on the other hand, of which China now has four of the Jin class, seems to be a 
sea-based deterrence force, assuring China’s capability to always being able to react to a nuclear 
attack. Some observers mention, however, that the (comparatively high) noise levels of these Jin 
class submarines result in relatively easy detection by U.S. anti-submarine warfare forces, thus 
limiting their effectiveness.65 Still, it must be noted that the development of the aforementioned 
Yuan class submarine had not been picked up by U.S. observers, and their appearance in 2004 came 
as a complete surprise, pointing to the fact that China is determined to secure its littoral area in the 
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near term, and is moving “aggressively to acquire the undersea capabilities to realize both its 
immediate goals vis-à-vis Taipei and its longer-term geopolitical aspirations”.66  
The third class generally used to analyse modern navies, aviation, includes the aforementioned 
aircraft carriers: one refurbished from a Ukrainian vessel, and one indigenously built carrier. It is 
speculated that China will eventually field four to six carriers.67 China is also continuously developing 
aircraft to be stationed on these carriers; as well as helicopters, amphibious transport docks (LPD), 
and landing helicopter docks (LHD), which will be very important assets in case of the invasion of 
Taiwan. 
 In appendix 1, data68 has been compiled on the amount of vessels that together compose the 
PLA Navy in 2005/2006, 2010/2011, and 2017/2018, as presented in Jane’s Fighting Ships. This data 
underlines the conclusion that quality is put above quantity, which mainly becomes visible in the 
declining number of diesel attack submarines, and the increase of the more modern and strategically 
more important nuclear-powered attack, and ballistic missile submarines. 
 
The PLAN in Chinese Defence White Papers 
 
All in all, the PLA Navy modernisation has been going on since the 1990s, and is still continuing. It is 
striking however, that it was only in 2004, with the publishing of the fourth69 Chinese defence white 
paper, that the PRC government explicitly introduces the Navy as being a priority in the development 
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of its army’s operational strength, whereas the 2002 defence white paper had only shortly 
introduced the PLA Navy as one of the branches of the People’s Liberation Army. In the 2004 white 
paper, the Navy is presented as a defensive force, responsible for the safeguarding of China’s 
maritime rights and interests, adhering to the strategic framework of offshore defence. This becomes 
evident from the focus that is placed in the paper on the building of amphibious combat forces, and 
the development of updated weaponry.70 
 The next defence white paper, issued in December 2006, in the second sentence of its 
preface, stresses the peacefulness of China’s development. As has been established in the 
introduction of this paper, this term was introduced around 2005 to curb growing fears of a rising 
China that might be seen as a threat to global security and stability, and because of the negative 
connotations that surrounded the term ‘China’s rise’. The existence of such a threat is even explicitly 
denied, and modernisation is said to be required to “keep […] up with new trends in the global 
revolution and development in military affairs”.71 This is reiterated in the national defence policy of 
active defence, outlined for the PLA in general in this 2006 white paper: modernisation is necessary 
“to build a powerful and fortified national defense”. For the Navy the goal is (amongst other things) 
set at “gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations”, meaning from the 
first island chain towards the second chain. 72 In the analysis of the Asia-Pacific security environment, 
a remark is made regarding this maritime theatre: conflicting claims over maritime rights and 
interests contribute to a growing complexity in the security environment.73 Here China seems not to 
be speaking about its own conflicts, but rather about territorial disputes between other Asia-Pacific 
nations, which is odd, given the amount of regional maritime disputes China still is involved in. China, 
however, is not silent about its own maritime disputes: in the chapter on border and coastal defence, 
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the PRC commits itself to managing “its border and sea areas in conformity with the [international] 
law”74, and says to be open for consultations about maritime issues with other nations. Some of 
those negotiations had already been started with. 
Another goal put forward in this white paper is the ‘informationisation’ of the PLA(N), i.e. the 
increased use of IT within the army as a means to win modern wars; meaning a focus on the 
development of more advanced weaponry, and retiring out-of-date equipment and information 
systems. In other words, making the military forces more ‘intelligent’, and capable of handling any 
threat against China. Here again becomes visible that quantity is less important than quality in the 
PLA strive for modernisation. 
In January 2009, a new defence white paper was issued, which stresses the progress that has 
already been made regarding China’s security situation, due to its modernisation efforts. Striking in 
this respect is the acknowledgement that the superiority of developed countries in military affairs is 
one of the issues China is facing.75 Next to that, this white paper introduces the strategic blueprint 
towards modernisation of the PLA and national defence in general, in three steps. These three steps 
are similar to the phases regarding the first, second, and third island chains mentioned before, and 
the second and third steps are planned to concur with the timeframe outlined for these phases: the 
first step, to be accomplished in 2010, was to lay a solid foundation for modernisation; the second to 
accomplish mechanisation (replacing labour done by hand with machines) and to greatly have 
enhanced informationisation within the armed forces by 2020; and the third to have reached 
modernisation by 2050. These strategic goals are to be accomplished by promoting 
informationisation, as had been set forward in the 2006 white paper; by balancing China’s economic 
growth with national defence building, i.e. to integrate the strategic framework for national defence 
within the framework for national development; by continually reforming the organisation of the 
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PLA, its structure, and its goals; and by stressing priorities and refraining from stressing non-
priorities, in order to achieve the highest development in key areas where it might surpass its 
competitors, a process that is called ‘leapfrogging’.76 Following the blueprint for the national defence 
development, the strategy of active defence is reiterated.  
Regarding maritime affairs, this 2008 white paper mentions that the Navy is a strategic service of 
the PLA, which means this goal formulated in 1985 has been accomplished in the eyes of China. 
Furthermore, it gives a brief overview of the historic development of the PLA Navy, its composition 
(without data on quantity), and again outlines its focus on informationisation. New is the formulation 
of the goal of improving maritime support systems, on shore as well as on the seas, and the focus on 
the training of maritime personnel.77   
In the 2010 defence white paper, published in March 2011, both the road of peaceful 
development and the active defence policy are stressed again, as is the complexity of China’s security 
situation in the global theatre.78 A slight change with the previous papers regarding this defence 
policy, is that the word ‘purely’, which in 2006 and 2008 was added to ‘defensive policy’, has been 
omitted.79 This fact might point to a gradual shift in the Chinese strategic framework concerning its 
national defence, which to date has not yet fully matured. The national defence policy still makes 
mention of safeguarding China’s maritime rights, which have been mentioned in previous white 
papers, as well as in the 1998 “National Ocean Policy of China”, assumedly referring to the UNCLOS, 
but sensitive to other interpretations serving China’s interests. In this respect, the modernisation of 
the Chinese PLA Navy, with mechanisation as its foundation, and informationisation as its driving 
force, as well as the modernisation of the PLA in general, is presented in this white paper as 
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necessary to keep up with the global revolution in military affairs (RMA), because not keeping up 
means not being able to safeguard China’s sovereignty. In line with the island chain developmental 
path, the PLAN in 2010 is developing “capabilities in conducting operations in distant waters”80, 
whereas in 2008 the focus was still on cooperation in distant waters. As a specific example of the 
modernisation efforts within the PLA Navy, “new types of submarines, surface vessels, and surface 
attack aircraft” are introduced as the spine of the PLAN weaponry system.81  A special section is 
devoted to escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia, where PLA naval vessels 
since December 2008 were tasked with safeguarding Chinese ships, but also with keeping an eye out 
for foreign ships, against pirate activity.82 Although the goal of realising global capabilities in 
protecting Chinese interest by the year 2050, is still more than 30 years away, this first cooperation in 
an international mission outside the first and second island chains, and even outside the Pacific area, 
provides proof of the Chinese navy already being capable to conduct such efforts in waters relatively 
far away from China’s coast. Finally, with regard to maritime affairs in this white paper, China 
stresses that its naval ships act strictly in accordance with international and Chinese law,83 and that it 
is actively taking part in bilateral and multilateral “dialogue and cooperation on international 
maritime security”.84 
The next defence white paper, published in April 2013, named The Diversified Employment of 
China’s Armed Forces, differs from the previous ones in the sense that it focuses specifically on the 
role of the Chinese armed forces, i.e. more than on the national defence strategy they follow. The 
road of peaceful development, and a defensive national defence policy are still referred to in the 
                                                          
80 Ibid., Ch. 3: Modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, subsection Building of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
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preface85, but when discussing China’s security situation it is implied that the ever more complex and 
challenging situation calls for a more diversified employment of the PLA and its various branches. It is 
explicitly mentioned that “[s]ome country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, 
expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser,” and it 
can safely be assumed that ‘some country’ stands for the United States. The example continues: “On 
the issues concerning China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some 
neighboring countries are taking actions that complicate or exacerbate the situation, and Japan is 
making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands.”86 So, in this 2013 white paper China is more 
vocal about what it perceives as threats against its sovereignty, rights and interests, which signals 
that China is prepared to tackle these issues, and possesses the self-confidence to do so. In other 
words, China here starts to show the ‘assertiveness’ that the government of Japan is referring to in 
August 2016.87  
The section on the PLA Navy for the first time mentions the development of blue-water 
capabilities, which is in line with phase III of the 1985 strategic framework, to have such capabilities 
by 2050. The total number of PLAN personnel is also revealed: 235,000 officers and men.88 
Furthermore, it is reported that the PLA Navy “maintains a military presence in relevant sea areas”, 
assumedly the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas, for patrols and to remain combat ready.89 
The safeguarding of China’s maritime rights and interests is also put forward in another section on 
this topic, where the necessity to become a maritime power is argued for: in order to sustain 
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Council 2013) Preface 
<http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986506.htm> [accessed 20 
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87 See the quote on page 3 of this paper. 
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development, the oceanic resources are of vital importance, as is the protection of overseas Chinese 
interests.90 
The latest defence white paper, named China’s Military Strategy, was published in May 2015, 
and (contrary to the previous one) focuses on strategy rather than on the armed forces themselves. 
The military strategy China follows is presented as the “overarching guidance for blueprinting and 
directing the building and employment of the country’s armed forces,”91 and as being important for 
China’s modernisation drive and its peaceful development. The name remained the same, active 
defence, but in this white paper the theory behind it is systematically expounded upon in the section 
on the “missions and strategic tasks of China’s armed forces”92 and especially in the chapter on active 
defence.93  Regarding China’s security situation, it is important to mention the comments made in 
the chapter on the national security situation about the maritime theatre. Former U.S. President 
Obama’s 2012 ‘pivot to Asia’, a rebalancing of the focus of U.S. foreign policy, shifting from Europe 
and the Middle East to Asia, is perceived by China as the reason why the U.S. is enhancing its military 
presence and alliances in the (East) Asian region. Next to that, mention is made of a number of (non-
specified) neighbouring countries which have taken provocative actions in the eyes of the Chinese, 
and “reinforce[d] their military presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally 
occupied”.94 This probably refers to Japan, in the Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands issue, and to various 
countries involved in the South China Sea conflict, such as the Philippines, and is seen as having a 
disturbing impact on the stability along China’s peripheral areas.  
The 1993 ‘Military Guidelines for the New Period’ aimed at winning local wars in conditions of 
modern technology, whereas in 2004 the aim was modified to winning local wars under conditions of 
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91 People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy (Information Office of the State Council 2015) Preface 
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informationisation. In this 2015 white paper, the aim is adjusted to winning informationised local 
wars, “highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS [preparation for military 
struggle]”.95 All of which means that China is stepping up its modernisation goals, and in particular 
the modernisation of its PLA Navy, in order to be able to win ever more complex wars, adhering to 
the principles of self-dependence, flexibility, and mobility. For the PLAN this means a shift from 
offshore waters defence towards offshore waters defence in combination with what is called ‘open 
seas protection’96. That term is not specified in the white paper, but it has at the very least something 
to do with the global aspirations of the Chinese Navy, as outlined in 1985. The seas and oceans are, in 
this respect, named ‘critical security domains’ in need of a capable navy to protect Chinese 
interests.97 
To conclude this section on the PLA Navy as put forward in the Chinese defence white papers 
since 2004, it has become evident that the phases of the maritime strategy set out by Admiral Liu in 
1985 are still followed, although the theory behind them has changed over time. Phase I, to be able 
to safeguard Chinese interests within the first island chain by the year 2010, seems to have been 
realised, just more or less a decade later than scheduled, and the Taiwan issue still remains a 
contingency in the Chinese maritime strategy. Phase II, to be reached in 2020, is well under way, and 
Phase III, which is the goal for 2050, is worked towards, as becomes evident from the Chinese naval 
presence in the water off the coast of Somalia, from its focus on the protection of international 
SLOCs, and from the constantly reiterated underlining of the protection of Chinese maritime rights 
and interests. All in all, the PLA Navy has become the strategic service within the PLA, as was its goal. 
And within the national security strategy, the role of the PLAN has grown over the years from 
peripheral defence, towards offshore defence in combination with open seas protection, indicating 
the enlarged scope of the Chinese Navy. 
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PLAN-related White Papers 
 
Evidently, not all white papers published by the Chinese government are related to national defence. 
Some however, are important to briefly discuss in the context of the topic of PLA Navy 
modernisation. The first is Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China, published in September 
201298, and the second is China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, which was published 
in January 2017.99 Diaoyu Dao, which explains why the Diaoyu islands belong to China (and not to 
Japan), does not mention the PLAN an sich, but does give an interesting insight into how far China is 
willing to go to secure its interests. It has “maintained routine presence and exercised jurisdiction in 
the waters of Diaoyu Dao. China’s maritime vessels have been carrying out law enforcement patrol 
missions […]”100, and will keep upholding China’s maritime rights and interests in this way. Next to 
that, the publishing of a white paper on this topic is not a small deal.  
The second paper concerns China’s view on the security situation of the Asia-Pacific region. It 
specifically mentions disputes over maritime rights and interests as a destabilizing factor in the area. 
Therefore, it commits itself to maintaining maritime security in the region, by having a physical 
presence on the seas, by negotiating, implementing, and safeguarding international rules, as well as 
by promoting cooperation. Noteworthy is that China, in the case of a maritime dispute, asks for 
involved states to respect historical facts which underscore territorial claims, given that China itself 
often makes use of historical sources to lend force to its claims.101 However, while declaring that 
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China abides by the international legal rules of conduct in maritime affairs, China accuses Japan of 
obstructing these legal mechanisms: 
“In response to Japan’s negative moves concerning historical and maritime territory issues, China urges 
Japan to abide by the four political documents and the four-point principled agreement on bilateral 
relations, properly manage and control disputes and conflicts, and avoid creating obstacles to the 
improvement of bilateral relations.”102 
This quote almost certainly concerns the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands dispute, which remains unresolved 
until today. Nevertheless, it is China’s opinion that in general the maritime situation in the region is 
balanced. Having said that, the next paragraphs reiterate China’s claims on the Nansha, or Spratly, 
islands and their waters, and on the Diaoyu islands, and renounce “certain countries’ provocations of 
regional disputes for their selfish interests”.103 Here, China gives its own view on why its naval forces 
behave as they do in the maritime theatre: the provocative actions of other countries must 
necessarily be responded to. And it is exactly this behaviour that is the subject of this paper. 
 
Recent PLAN Activity 
 
The introduction provided two quotes from the governments of Japan and Taiwan, which address 
Chinese behaviour in the maritime theatre, and express concern about the ‘assertiveness’ of this 
behaviour. The above has provided the rationale as to why China behaves as it does, on the basis of 
the national defence strategy, and in particular the maritime strategy, as outlined in the various 
(defence) white papers published by the government of the People’s Republic of China. Remains the 
task in this first chapter to give a few examples of the deployment of PLA Navy forces that have 
prompted neighbouring countries to express their concern. It must be noted here that it is not the 
goal of this paper to discuss in depth each and every maritime dispute China is involved in, for the 
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simple reason that much has been already written about those issues, in particular about the Diaoyu-
Senkaku, and South China Sea disputes. The examples given here are meant to sketch an image of 
Chinese behaviour that could be seen as provocative by outsiders. 
In the Yellow Sea China is involved in a dispute over a submerged rock, which internationally is 
called Socotra Rock, and plays an important role in the discussion about the Air Defence 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) of China, South Korea, and to a lesser extent, Japan.104 Contrary to the 
deployment of the Korean Coast Guard to guard the marine science base built by South Korea on the 
rock105, Chinese naval forces have as of yet not been deployed to lend force to its claim, although 
Chinese aircraft have been in the area regularly. However, in 2017 China at least twice sealed off a 
part of the Yellow Sea for all maritime traffic, for large-scale maritime purposes. The main intention 
of this drill, which according to the South China Morning Post included “offensive and defensive 
manoeuvres with surface ships, submarines, air support, and coastguard forces”106, seems to have 
been to give a strong reaction to North Korean missile tests, but must also be seen as a display of 
force to deter various other players in the region. 
In the East China Sea, the main dispute China is involved in, next to its claim on Taiwan, concerns 
the Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands. And in this dispute, China has indeed deployed its naval forces. The 
islands are claimed by Japan, Taiwan, and China, and has been the cause of great tensions between 
primarily China and Japan.107 Following various clashes involving fishermen, and vessels of the 
Chinese Coast Guard, allegedly, in January 2013, a frigate of the PLA Navy locked weapons-guiding 
                                                          
104 See e.g. Scott W. Harold, ‘Ieodo as metaphor? The growing importance of sovereignty disputes in South 
Korea--China relations and the role of the United States’, Asian Perspective 36:2 (2012) 287–307. 
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radars on a ship of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force near the islands.108 In June 2016, a PLA 
Navy frigate for the first time entered the contiguous zone around one of the islands, whereas before 
only vessels of the Chinese Coast Guard had entered these waters. Japanese officials spoke of China 
‘unilaterally heightening tensions’.109 On top of that, in January 2018, both a PLA Navy frigate and a 
nuclear attack submarine were spotted in the contiguous zone of the islands.110 
 Finally, in the South China Sea theatre, a number of countries is involved in various disputes 
over several chunks of the area. China claims the area within the so-called ‘nine-dash line’, which 
encompasses almost the sea as a whole. This claim overlaps with claims and/or the exclusive 
economic zones of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Taiwan. It is in this dispute that 
the PLA Navy has been active the most. Examples range from creating artificial islands, constructing 
military structures on reefs, naval patrols, to large scale military exercises. One of these exercises, 
which took place in July 2016, involved vessels from three of the four Chinese fleets, and conducted 
live-fire drills, with top military commander on-site.111 The fact that this show of force took place just 
a few days before a ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on issues related to 
the South China Sea, is remarkable. Next to that, in December 2016, a Chinese submarine seized a 
U.S. underwater drone; more drills followed in 2017 and 2018; and China announced that Chinese 
naval vessels will shadow foreign military vessels in the South China Sea.   
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Conclusion 
 
Concluding, this first chapter has given an overview of the changes within the Chinese national 
defence strategy, and the influence this had on China’s maritime strategy and on the PLA Navy. It has 
become evident that the Chinese naval modernisation was a result of an outward, rather than 
inward, looking national defence strategy over the course of the years since 1985. Mahanian thought 
and Admiral Liu have given the first impetus for this modernisation, and these theories still appear to 
have a considerable influence, given the regular shows of force of the PLA Navy as described in the 
examples above. The next chapter will study the defence white papers of various countries in the 
region, in order to find out whether or not they communicated their worries regarding this issue, and 
how it is officially perceived. 
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Chapter 2 – Perception of the Chinese Naval Modernisation in East Asia 
 
As a result of the Chinese naval modernisation, and the adaptation of China’s maritime strategy, PLA 
Navy vessels around 2018 are much more present in the maritime theatre off the coast of China and 
beyond, than they were in in the twentieth century, or even in the first decade of the current 
century. The expanding Chinese view, with objectives within the first, second, and third island chains, 
and presumably global aspirations, can seem threatening to other countries. How peaceful is the 
peaceful development China advocates actually? In order to find out how the PLA Navy 
modernisation, and its behaviour off the coast of East Asia, is officially perceived, this paper again 
turns to defence white papers. This second chapter will examine the defence white papers published 
by the three countries that are located in the northern half of the first island chain112, i.e. South 
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (Chapter 3 will turn to the four nations located in the southern half of the 
first island chain). Each of the aforementioned nations is in one way or another involved in a 
maritime dispute with China. A selection of the examples that will be discussed below is: with South 
Korea, Socotra Rock in the Yellow Sea; with Japan, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea; 
with Taiwan, various (groups of) islands in the South China Sea. Phase I of the Chinese national 
security strategy, for the PRC to be able to defend Chinese interests within this first island chain, has 
been completed by 2010, whereas phase II aimed at the second island chain, is to be realised by 
2020. Now that the first phase has been completed, it is necessary to examine how the nations that 
are geographically closest to these developments within the PLA, and where a possible threat might 
be the biggest, perceive those developments. 
Of each nation, the defence white papers published since December 2004 (which was the 
year in which the Chinese defence white paper for the first time introduced the PLA Navy as being a 
priority in the development of the army’s operational strength) will be examined, looking for 
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references to China or which might be implying China. And, in the case that more than one defence 
white paper has been published since December 2004 and the references to China are sufficient 
enough, whether or not the perception of China by that particular countries has altered over time.  
 
South Korea 
 
The Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Korea (ROK) publishes a defence white paper 
biannually, and the first of those to be published after December 2004 was issued in December 2006. 
The number of references (by name) to China in this issue is 41, and seem to be primarily positive. 
When discussing the regional security structure, China’s continuing economic growth is mentioned as 
one of the factors that enhance the strategic status of Northeast Asia, increasing economic 
cooperation and interdependence. However, reference is made to a trend of countries seeking to 
increase their influence in the region, although it is not specified which countries. Neither is specified 
which countries are meant, when a remark is made about regional frictions being added to by 
concerns about territorial claims. 113 Next to that, it becomes clear that the modernisation efforts of 
the Chinese and others in the region have attracted the attention of the Korean government. In the 
section that specifically discusses China as one of the major powers surrounding the Korean 
Peninsula, the PLA Navy is specifically mentioned as expanding its area of operations.114 
 The tone of the 2008 edition does not differ greatly from the previous one. A reference is 
made to the possibility of EEZ’s becoming a source of unrest115, which might point to the discussion 
over Socotra Rock. New is that China is explicitly mentioned as one of the countries seeking to 
enhance their influence in the region, especially in a military way, whereas in the previous edition, 
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this issue remained vague. Taken as a whole the 2008 defence white paper is not very much 
concerned with China, but rather with a new Korean vision on its defence, aimed at reforming the 
military. 
 In the defence white paper published in 2010, however, the number of references to China 
has doubled to 81. Although this does not say much, because of the addition of an overview of the 
major developments in negotiation process in North Korea’s nuclear programs, in which China is 
mentioned quite a few times because of its role in this process (to which no judgement of value is 
added in this white paper).116 So, it is not the number of times China is mentioned that is important, 
but rather the context in which the reference is made. One of these references pertains to the 
modernisation of the Chinese military. South Korea holds the opinion that competition with 
(amongst other nations) Japan is one of the reasons China is building up its Navy.117 Its exact choice 
of words is ‘vying’, which has in it a sense of a zero-sum rivalry, thus signalling South Korea’s worries 
about this development. On the other hand, cooperation with China is promoted on various 
diplomatic and military levels.  
 The element of competition comes back in the 2012 defence white paper, where natural 
resources are mentioned as a new variable in security strategies. This remark is placed next to the 
conclusion that maritime disputes in Asia are intensifying118, signalling a correlation between these 
two topics in the eyes of South Korea. The remaining remarks regarding China are all reiterations of 
comments in the previously discussed defence white papers. 
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 In the 2014 edition, the military competition is expressed to be an arms race that is 
intensifying, and is placed in the same sentence with historical and territorial conflicts, as being a 
threat to national and international security.119 These local (territorial) conflicts, such as in the South 
China and East China Seas, are worrisome to South Korea and specific examples of behaviour that 
causes tension to escalate are mentioned: the deployment of naval vessels and military aircraft to 
the disputed areas, and the organisation of military exercises in these areas.120 China is not 
specifically mentioned, but must necessarily be included in “the parties” that are involved in these 
disputes. Next to that, according to South Korea, security cooperation is lagging behind in Northeast 
Asia, whereas security uncertainties have increased. The rise of China will play an important role in 
the stability of security in this region. An arms race between countries in the Asia-Pacific area and 
increased competition for influence, in which China is a pivotal factor, all affect the security 
environment. The ‘vying’, used in the 2010 edition to describe the arms race between China and 
Japan, now includes Russia as well. 121  
What is interesting in this edition is the addition of a special appendix on the adjustment of 
the Korean Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) as a reaction to China making an adjustment to its 
ADIZ in 2013, thus including Socotra Rock, named Ieodo in Korean, which by South Korea is seen as 
its territory. The ensuing South Korean statement is one of the few instances of an expression of 
sentiment in the defence white papers, as opposed to factual remarks, which are abundant. The text 
is as follows: 
“(1) Considering the trust between the ROK and China, it is truly regrettable that prior consultations 
did not take place regarding China’s ADIZ, which even overlaps with the KADIZ in some parts and 
includes Ieodo. This is unacceptable from the ROK side. 
(2) Regardless of the establishment of ADIZs by neighboring countries, the ROK’s jurisdiction over 
Ieodo and surrounding waters will not be affected. 
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(3) We demand that China adjust the areas overlapping with the KADIZ. We also consider expanding 
the KADIZ to protect our national interests. 
(4) We are concerned about the potential build-up of military tensions due to measures taken by 
China. It is necessary to have discussions among the nations concerned to enhance trust and alleviate 
tensions.”122 
South Korea is making a firm stand for its interests, by pointing at the fact that China has unilaterally, 
and without warning, adjusted its ADIZ, and that this is unacceptable for the ROK. The government 
uses strong words, and calls it an “unexpected security crisis situation”.123 As a result of this 
adjustment, South Korea feels compromised in the trust it had in the relationship with its neighbour. 
But, and this is a more surprising statement, point 4 is about more than the ADIZ adjustment alone: it 
speaks about Chinese “measures”, in plural, indicating that there are more issues South Korea is 
concerned about. These issues might lead to a “build-up of military tensions”, which should be 
bilaterally, or even multilaterally, discussed according to the ROK.  
 The most recent South Korean defence white paper, published in 2016, opens with a section 
on regional disputes triggered by traditional conflict factors, amongst which territorial claims. The 
first example of such a dispute given, is the South China Sea, indicating the importance South Korea 
attaches to this issue, even though it is not a party in it. The sentence “while China is continuing its 
efforts to strengthen its maritime jurisdictional status by taking actions such as constructing artificial 
islands in the South China Sea, the U.S. is strengthening military cooperation with its allies in the 
region, calling for freedom of navigation” and the remark that Beijing does not show respect for 
international rulings124, show that South Korea is worried about Chinese behaviour. The ROK has 
appealed for a peaceful solution to this dispute, via negotiations.125 This sentiment is reiterated in 
the discussion of the security environment in the region, where the pursuit of influence in the region, 
the modernisation of the military, a “proactive” foreign policy, and “aggressively responding to issues 
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that are related to its core national interests” are all mentioned in relation with China.126 Given that 
territorial integrity is related to China’s core interests, the displays of naval force in disputed 
maritime areas, as described in chapter 1, the ROK here qualifies that behaviour as aggressive.  
 In conclusion, the South Korean defence white papers published since 2006 sketch an image 
of increasing worries about China’s influence on regional security. The topic of territorial disputes in 
maritime areas has become more prominent over time, and the Korean government has become 
more vocal about its worries, primarily since 2014, when the unilateral Chinese adjustment of its 
ADIZ directly affected South Korean interests.  
 
Japan 
 
Contrary to its neighbour to the west, the Japanese Ministry of Defence publishes a defence white 
paper annually, outlining Japan’s security environment, its defence policy, and measures to be taken 
to improve the country’s safeness from internal and external threats. It is in this respect interesting 
to note that article 9 of Japan’s post-World War II constitution does not allow the threat or use of 
force as a means to settle international disputes, and that in order to accomplish that goal, no army, 
navy, air force or other war potential will be maintained. Although the opposition to this article is 
growing, in effect it still needs to be worked around. By means of various so-called (government-
approved) ‘reinterpretations’ of the ninth article Japan does however maintain de facto armed 
forces, which officially are branches of the national police force. It is important to keep this 
constitutional background in mind when discussing the Japanese defence white papers. 
 The first such paper published after December 2004, was issued in 2005, and the first context 
in which China is mentioned in this paper, is in the context of its continued rise as an economic and 
political power, followed by its military modernisation.127 This is said to draw attention from other 
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states in the Asian-Pacific region, but it is not specified in which respect. It might be assumed that 
Japan is referring to other countries modernising their military capabilities as well, partly because of 
the enhanced threat of non-traditional security issues, but also partly as a reaction to these military 
developments within China. Next to that, China’s relationship with Taiwan, with the U.S. and others 
is reviewed, before a turn is made to Chinese military affairs. The basic principles of China’s national 
defence policy are given, though not discussed, with the exception of the Chinese promotion of 
informationisation128, which is judged to be “aggressively” promoted as the core of the Revolution in 
Worldwide Affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics.129 In this respect, Japan also strongly asks 
China for more transparency on its defence expenses, by specifying its allotment. Moreover, Japan’s 
worries about China’s modernisation efforts are expressed in the comment that careful evaluation of 
the military modernisation against the level necessary for national defence is necessary.130 With 
regard to the naval modernisation, China’s maritime activities are called ‘vigorous’, and a specific 
example is given of an incident which involved a submerged nuclear-powered submarine of the PLA 
Navy intruding into Japanese territorial waters. 131All in all, the prominence of China in this 2005 
white paper is striking when compared with how other countries are discussed. 
 The 2006 paper does not bring many new insights regarding Japan’s perception of China to 
the table. Next to a rather factual discussion of the 2004 Chinese defence white paper, which is said 
still not to be transparent enough,132 and a paragraph on the Chinese military modernisation efforts, 
the only new information concerns (allegedly) Chinese intelligence gathering against Japan by both 
PLA aircraft and naval vessels. Nevertheless, these activities are not condemned in the Japanese 
white paper, it is only remarked that attention should be paid to these trends, 133 and that Japan’s 
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response capability should be improved.134The same applies to Japan’s stance in the South China Sea 
conflict.135 
 The 2007 issue was the first defence white paper published by the newly established 
Japanese Ministry of Defence. Nonetheless, regarding China, it is heavily based on the previous 
one(s), to such an extent that various paragraphs are identical with the exception of in-text data, 
such as the number of missiles China possesses. This issue discusses the 2006 defence white paper 
published by China, but again this account is rather factual. In the 2007 issue, as well as in the 2008 
issue (which again is very similar to its predecessors) various themes are reiterated: the Chinese 
military modernisation efforts; the lack of transparency; the ‘aggressive’ promotion of the RMA with 
Chinese characteristics; the 2004 submarine incident; and the increased naval activities. The version 
of 2008 however, differs from that of 2007 in a certain aspect. Whereas in 2007 was spoken about 
increasing “concerns over the future modernization of the Chinese military forces”136, thus not 
specifying who was concerned, in 2008 this was changed to “concern about how China’s military 
strength will impact the regional situation and Japanese security”137, which is a more substantial 
concern showing Japanese worries about its national security. 
 The Japanese defence white papers being heavily based on the previous one(s) when 
discussing China, continues throughout the issues of 2009 until 2017, which is exemplified by the 
introductory sentence to the chapter relating to China, which has changed only slightly in the eleven 
years since 2006, from “China has the world’s largest population with a variety of races, religions, 
and languages in a vast land surrounded by as many as 14 countries and the Pacific Ocean”138 to 
“China, the world’s most populous country, has a vast landmass surrounded by a long borderline 
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shared with 14 countries as well as a long coastline”139 in 2017. Not even major events in Japan, such 
as the change of government following the 2009 general elections, in which the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party lost its status as the largest party in the Japanese Diet for the first time since the 
Second World War, had a significant influence on the content of the sections regarding China, 
indicating the conformity of political Japan on this issue. 
Seemingly, only a few comments regarding time-susceptible data and recent events have 
been added to each year’s new issue, next to the continued reiteration of important themes such as 
the unprecedented growth of the Chinese economy and the subsequent overall development, but 
primarily the military advancements and the modernisation efforts within the PLA put forward by the 
Chinese government. These developments are said to have drawn the attention of various nations, 
and Japan in particular is committed to paying attention to the military developments in China, 
especially in combination with the aforementioned lack of transparency from the Chinese side 
regarding these issues. Practical examples of the impact the Chinese military developments have on 
Japanese affairs that are repeatedly mentioned throughout the defence white papers are the 
increased Chinese activities in waters near Japan, which are perceived by Japan as intelligence 
gathering missions, as well as the 2004 submarine incident, the Song-class submarine surfacing near 
the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in 2006, and the deliberate destruction of a Chinese satellite using 
a ballistic missile in 2007. Next to that, a resurfacing theme is the intensifying Chinese activities in the 
South China Sea around the Spratly and Paracel Islands. There is however one comment the Japanese 
Ministry of Defence has scaled back on: since the 2009 issue, the word ‘aggressively’, which was used 
to describe China’s promotion of the RMA with Chinese characteristics, has been replaced with the 
word ‘active’.140 Apparently, a word such as ‘aggressively’ was deemed to be a too strong description. 
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However, the ‘new’ comments as mentioned above yield some interesting information 
(when they appear for the first time since, naturally, these comments are echoed in subsequent 
issues). In the issue of 2009, for example, the aforementioned lack of transparency regarding China’s 
national defence, is noted to be a factor that might add to the “distrust and misunderstandings”141 of 
other states, although Japan is not specifically named as one of those states. The Chinese 
transparency, according to Japan, has improved with the publishing of various documents on the 
country’s military capabilities, but is still not at the level a “major regional power” is expected to 
achieve.142 Whereas in the 2009 issue China is said to be a major regional power, in the 2011 issue 
China is portrayed by Japan as a big power (in a global sense), which should take the responsibility 
that comes with that status143, and again in 2013 which strongly expects China to “recognize its 
responsibility […], accept and stick to international norms, and play a more active and cooperative 
role in regional and global issues”144, showing some annoyance towards the way China handles its 
(international) affairs. Moreover, Japan’s judgement about the Chinese white papers published in 
2013 and 2015 is not kind: the expected transparency has not been given, but has instead 
declined,145 and the explanations given for various incidents are “contrary to the truth”, which incites 
concerns.146 It is acknowledged though, that China does to a certain extent take up on this 
responsibility by “playing a certain role in non-traditional security areas”, which is welcomed by the 
international community, this time specifically including Japan. Especially the Chinese participation in 
various U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and the cooperation in an international setting as in the 
anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the coast of Somalia are lauded. 147 On the 
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other hand, the successfulness of China’s taking part in the mission against piracy, which was its first 
mission in distant waters from China, is seen as a demonstration of the PLA Navy’s capacity to do so 
increasingly further away, and as an emphasis on China’s interest in the protection of its strategic sea 
lanes of communication (SLOCs),148 which aptly are called China’s lifelines.149 On top of that, the 
advancement of the aircraft carrier Liaoning into the Western Pacific was confirmed for the first 
time, as described in the 2017 issue, and is said to indicate the enhancement of China’s capability to 
project force in distant areas.150 
 Regarding the Senkaku Islands, which have been mentioned in the previous chapter of this 
paper, and several of which islands the Japanese government claims to have bought in 2012 from a 
private Japanese citizen, Japan’s stance is clear: these islands are the inherent territory of Japan. This 
issue, which has been mentioned several times in chapter 1 of this paper, started around 2012, and 
in the 2013 issue, the islands are for the first time claimed to be Japan’s inherent territory.151 Chinese 
naval vessels in the waters around these islands are said to intrude into Japanese territorial waters, 
which is strongly condemned by Japan. These infringements are not in compliance with international 
law,152 are unilaterally escalated activities by China,153 are “creating a situation that is of serious 
concern”, has become more aggressive in form, and is totally unacceptable. 154 Less strong are the 
expressions are used to describe the increased activities of Chinese naval vessels and aircraft in the 
waters around Japan itself. These “dangerous acts”155, deemed to be for intelligence gathering 
purposes, are “expanding and intensifying”, which concerns the region, and in particular Japan.156 
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 Although Japan is not involved in the South China Sea conflict, it keeps a close eye on the 
development of this dispute. In 2015 Japan noted international concern about Chinese land 
reclamation in the area, because these artificial islands are supposedly used to build runways, ports 
and other (military) infrastructures on.157 Here again, Japan claims that the explanations China gives 
about the “coercive, rapid, and large-scale developments” in the South China Sea, are false.158 Next 
to that, although other countries involved in the conflict are carrying out the same activities as China 
does, the scale on which and the pace in which China works, are incomparable with each other. The 
fact that China may be able to use military facilities in the South China Sea to gather intelligence from 
neighbouring countries, worries Japan, and is a concern for the safety of the entire world because of 
its direct influence on peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.159   
A special section on maritime trends is added to the defence white papers from 2015 
onwards, because of the vital importance of the ‘seas’ to the security situation of an island nation 
such as Japan, in which the trends that Japan observes in the maritime theatre are discussed. 
Naturally, due to its geographic position, this section focuses most on the maritime theatres near 
Japan. In relation to the principles of freedom of the high seas of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Japan signals a trend of unilateralism, in which nations more and more 
base their actions on their own assertions. It is striking, however, that most of the examples of such 
unilateral acts concern China’s posture in the East China and South China Seas, and that Japan is 
demanding the cessation of the measures going against the UNCLOS.160 This is one of the very few 
actual demands (as contrary to expectations and urgings) Japan makes in its white papers, possibly 
because this demand is based on international law. 
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 Overall, Japan says, China’s activities in both the East China and South China Seas incite 
concerns161, are subject to China’s own interpretation regarding the legal status of its coastal 
zones162, and its measures are assertive in nature, attempting to change the status quo,163 in such a 
way as to turn  its efforts into a fait accompli.164 Japan’s view is best summarised in the white paper 
published in 2015:  
“While advocating “peaceful development”, China, particularly over maritime issues where its 
interests conflict with others’, based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international 
legal order, continues to act in an assertive manner, including coercive attempts at changing the status 
quo, and is poised to fulfil its unilateral demands without compromise. China’s actions include 
dangerous acts that may invite unintended consequences, raising concerns over China’s future 
direction.”165 
The Japanese defence white papers published since 2004 sketch an increasingly complex security 
environment with which Japan has to deal. Given the fact that Japan is an island nation, the maritime 
domain is assigned a lot of attention, and in that domain China is prominently present. Japan signals 
the trends of the PLA (Navy) modernisation and is, due to its proximity to China, one of the first 
recipients of the effects of this development. Over the years, Japan has become more vocal about its 
concerns. On the one hand to further its own interests, and on the other hand because of the 
increased assertiveness of the Chinese activities that affect Japan. 
 
Taiwan 
 
One of the first sentences in the 2006 National Defence Report of the Republic of China (ROC) 
summarises the basic theme of this, and the following, defence white papers of Taiwan:  
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“For more than five decades, China, on the opposite side of the Taiwan Strait, has not once denounced 
the use of military force to annex Taiwan. Not only does this represent the most serious threat posed 
to Taiwan’s national defense, but also the gravest challenge to Taiwan’s continued survival.”166 
Taiwan has a unique position vis-à-vis China, given the interwoven history of the two republics. 
Although China claims Taiwan to be a renegade province that ought to be reunited with the 
motherland, the situation in 2018 is that Taiwan is de facto independent, but cannot formally declare 
that independency, for fear of retaliation by China. In this is Taiwan’s defence different from nations 
such as South Korea and Japan, whose defence is not aimed at survival an sich, but more on the 
deterrence of hostile forces. All-out defence against possible aggression by the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) is thus the main theme of the Taiwanese defence white papers. 
 The six white papers published by the ROC in the years following 2004, (naturally) contain an 
enormous amount of references to the PRC. Regarding China’s strategy towards Taiwan, Taiwan 
makes in its white papers the distinction between political coercion, economic magnetism, military 
intimidation, diplomatic interference, and psychological infiltration.167 In order to keep the focus of 
this paper on the reactions to China’s military, and primarily naval, modernisation, solely the 
references that pertain to this issue, and contain a judgment of value will be discussed. In this 
respect, it must be noted that since 2006, when the first post-2004 white paper was published, the 
modernisation efforts of the PLA have not escaped the attention of the ROC. These military 
developments make the PRC in the eyes of Taiwan “the greatest uncertainty in Asia-Pacific 
security.”168 And, noting that the maritime theatre will become more and more important over the 
years, maritime interest movements and competition over resources have increased, which has a 
negative influence on the security situation of the region. Taiwan argues that the military posture of 
the PRC in the area, and especially vis-à-vis Taiwan, “completely contradicts the peaceful 
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development principles it continues to espouse to external audiences.”169 This becomes exemplified 
in the many territorial issues China is involved in with other nations in the region.  
 It is noted that the PRC has had an evolving interpretation of its military strategy of active 
defence, and the changes these different interpretations entail have a distorting influence on the 
defensive nature of the strategy.170 The resulting, more offensive strategy, coupled with PLA 
modernisations, has led to increased naval and aerial “provocative”171 activities near Taiwan. In 
Taiwan, this “aggressively”172 pursued modernisation is seen as military intimidation in order to force 
the ROC to surrender.173 Thus, Taiwanese perceptions of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ (or, ‘development’ 
from 2006 onwards), and its policy of ‘peaceful unification’ with Taiwan are sceptical. When Beijing 
has secured its military dominance, it is considered to be in a favourable position in case it will make 
use of force to enforce re-unification,174 although this is considered not to be the case before 2008.175 
The aim of the tactics employed by the PCR against Taiwan is to “shake [Taiwan’s] armed forces’ 
morale, disintegrate [Taiwan’s] people’s mental defense, and mislead international perceptions.”176 
 The rapid modernisation of the Chinese armed forces, and the threat this development 
entails for the ROC, is also the main theme of the ROC defence white paper published in 2008. In this 
2008 issue, the military expansions following the increasing strength of the RPC, are called 
“ambitious”, ‘savage’, and a greater threat to regional stability than is North Korea.177 It is 
noteworthy that, in the discussion of regional security, Taiwan places the developments between 
nations not in a bilateral context, but rather in the context of the maritime theatre, i.e. in the context 
of the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas, and the Taiwan Strait, thus underlining the 
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importance of this theatre in the Asia-Pacific region.178 With respect to the Asian maritime arena, the 
ROC claims that “the PRC is trying extremely hard to conceal its strategic intentions of controlling the 
western Pacific waters […] intent on crossing the first islet chain”179, although no example of such 
concealment is provided. Next to that, PRC aerial and naval activities near Taiwan, (i.e. not only in 
the Taiwan Strait, but also around the island, and across the region), are considered to be of an 
intelligence gathering nature, and are also tests of Taiwan’s response time.180 
 Similar to the 2008 issue, the Taiwanese defence white paper published in 2011 does not 
contain many new judgements of value regarding the PRC’s (naval) military modernisation. New is 
that the PRC campaign to assure the international community of the peaceful nature of its 
developmental path is juxtaposed with the Taiwanese perception of China’s expanding military 
power.181 That even this critical evaluation is mistaken sometimes, becomes evident from the fact 
that in 2011 the ROC analysis anticipated the deployment of PRC aircraft carriers by 2020,182 whereas 
the first (refurbished) carrier was added to the fleet in 2013, and the first indigenously built carrier is 
scheduled to be finished by the end of 2018. Another new element is the viewpoint that the PRC uses 
U.N. anti-piracy missions as an opportunity to “extend the long distance operation and cooperation 
capabilities of its navy”183. These missions are a check for the combat readiness of men and (new) 
equipment, as well as live exercises.  
  All in all, the military developments, enhancing “its ability to terrorize with military force”184, 
within the PLA are noted to be ahead of schedule in the 2011 issue, and the ROC judges that the PRC 
uses “this opportunity to show its ambition and confidence in its military strategies”185, although it 
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does not become clear whether the use of the term ‘ambition’ refers to PRC policy, or to PRC military 
activities as well. The first is the more likely option, because military activities against Taiwan, e.g. 
exercises, are said to be more ‘subtle’, and not more overt.186 Cross-strait relations are gradually 
improving, although the PRC has still not renounced the possible use of military power to enforce 
unification. Operations concerning the South China Sea, on the other hand, are now said to have a 
larger portion of the attention of the PLA.187 Thus, when the PRC stated in its 2011 defence white 
paper that its peaceful development does not pose a threat to the global community, Taiwan 
chooses to use an interesting figure of speech to counter that statement: it states that “the world 
was not convinced”.188 The fact that the ROC remained unconvinced is clear, but to claim that the 
entire rest of the world was too, seems a bit over the top. Perhaps Taiwan here is attempting to use 
the general consensus of the global community to its advantage, and to underline its claim that the 
PRC does pose a threat to security. 
 In 2013, the ROC published a new National Defense Report, which again perceives the PRC to 
be the greatest threat to its national security, even though the focus of the PRC’s current military 
strategy is said to be focussed on the East China and South China Seas.189 In this respect, the addition 
of an aircraft carrier to the PLA Navy, is seen as a tool to lend force to the sovereignty claims of the 
PRC, as is the deployment of (parts of) its fleets to disputed territories and outside of the first island 
chain.190 The ROC government explicitly calls upon nations surrounding the East China and South 
China Seas to “exercise self-restraint, to resolve disputes via negotiation and dialogue mechanisms, 
and to avoid armed conflicts […]”191, which is the first time the ROC does that. The reason for this 
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behaviour might be hidden in the fact that Taiwan claims that the more relaxed cross-strait relations 
are used by the PRC to “weaken [ROC] awareness of the enemy”192.  
 2015 marked the publishing of a new Taiwanese defence white paper. In this white paper, 
China’s military threat, notwithstanding easing tensions in cross-strait relations, remains the focus of 
the ROC defence policy. Its rapid military development continues to exert an influence on the 
balance of cross-strait military power, tilting it in favour of the PRC; and to invoke amongst 
neighbouring countries.193 The measures taken by the PRC in maritime disputes, point at the 
ambitions of China in regional affairs.194 Specifically mentioned are the focus on the development of 
the PLA Navy within the PLA, land reclamation in the South China Sea, and expanded maritime 
patrols in the East China Sea.195 No judgement of value is given, beyond a mere statement that the 
PLA Navy’s abilities “to initiate nuclear counterattack, deny foreign military access, and blockade and 
control of the Taiwan Strait” are growing.196 
 The latest defence white paper published by the ROC was released in late 2017, and has the 
same main theme as the previous ones. As a result of the expansion of the PLA, the PLA Navy and 
Airforce are said to project the PRC’s military force outside the first island chain, “further into the 
area west of the second island chain”, thus challenging the security of the region.197 Special attention 
is given to the establishment of a PLA Support Base in Djibouti, “a key point that allows control of 
vital Middle East, Asian and European shipping routes”, which is seen as an extension of the military 
power of the PRC.198 Peacekeeping and anti-piracy missions are interpreted by the ROC as attempts 
to internationally mould an image of the PRC as developing peacefully and responsibly.199 
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 Concluding, it is clear that the ROC regards the PRC as the biggest threat to its national 
security, and is concerned about the military developments within the PLA, in particular because of 
the large gap in defence spending between the two countries, and because the PRC has never 
renounced the possibility of the use of force in its quest for re-unification. Although strongly worded 
judgements of value are almost non-existent, the ROC is in no way positive about the developments 
on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. It perceives the threat to its survival to be growing, based on 
the increased activity and ambitiousness of the PLA Navy in the waters surrounding Taiwan. 
 
Analysis 
 
Concluding, this second chapter has given an overview of the official perceptions that the northern 
nations within the first island chain have of the modernisation efforts of the PLA Navy, and the 
behaviour of the Chinese Navy that these modernisations entail, by analysing their respective 
defence white papers. The following section will provide a short analysis of the white papers 
published by these nations. 
 It is evident that all 25 white papers studied above agree on the fact that the international, 
regional, and national security situations have grown to be increasingly complex, and that 
developments within the PLA Navy have contributed to this complexity. And although some of these 
developments, such as the participation in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) are lauded, most have 
incited concerns about the future. All in all, China’s behaviour in the maritime arena is seen as 
destabilising regional security. In the studied period of time, from 2004 onwards, this perception of 
China in South Korea and Japan has evolved, and grown more vocal. The South Korean defence white 
papers of 2006 through 2012 were primarily positive towards China: the modernisation of the PLAN 
is mentioned, but it remains just an observation. From the 2014 issue onwards, the perception of the 
Chinese developments has become increasingly negative, which is primarily due to South Korea being 
dragged into the conflict about the delineation of the Chinese and Korean ADIZ, which compromised 
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South Korean trust in its neighbour. From that year onwards, South Korea provides examples of 
Chinese behaviour, and specifically expresses its worries about this behaviour in the Asia-Pacific area.  
 The same applies to Japan, although to a lesser extent: Japan, in the earlier issues that have 
been studied, was more vocal than South Korea, using more judgements of value and directly 
addressing China by asking for more transparency regarding its defence expenses. Over time, it has 
grown even more vocal as more incidents in the maritime area occurred, particularly since the 
escalation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue around 2012. This conclusion is underlined by an EU Institute 
for Security Studies publication, which states that China’s rise is perceived as much less of a threat in 
Seoul than it is in Tokyo, which is partly based in a shared Chinese and Korean historical resentment 
towards Japan over Japanese war crimes. And next to that, for South Korea it is the increasing US-
China competition in the region that poses challenges to the diversification of its regional 
partnerships, rather than the rise of China itself.200 
Taiwan, on the other hand, does not see such an evolvement in perception, since the PRC has 
always been regarded as the biggest threat to its survival. That threat has, in the eyes of Taiwan, only 
increased with the modernisation of the PLA Navy, and the ensuing behaviour, such as live exercises 
near Taiwan.  
 So, from the above it can be concluded that various countries started voicing their concerns 
more loudly when they became involved in one or another conflict with China. The point of this 
might be to find allies for their cause, in order to stay stronger against China together. According to 
the white papers, security cooperation is not the strong suit of the Asian-Pacific region201, even 
though allies are indispensable against the maritime Goliath China has become. On the other hand, 
South Korea and Japan both know themselves to be backed by the United States, which may be the 
reason they dare voice their concerns in the first place. Taiwan does too, but its unique position vis-
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à-vis China would allow it to speak even more freely. It is thus remarkable that both South Korea and 
Japan are more specific than Taiwan in pointing out Chinese behaviour that is in their eyes 
unacceptable. The reason for this might be found in the fact that South Korea and Japan have to 
navigate the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, whereas to Taiwan all Chinese 
activities against Taiwan are unacceptable.  
 Chinese behaviour is also seen as possibly threatening the economic growth of the respective 
nations, as well as their political independence. For instance, Japan states that “developments 
associated with the freedom of navigation in the sea have been subject to increasing international 
concern”.202 And with reason, for Chinese control of the SLOCs in the South East Asian region would 
“make the economic futures of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan subject in some measure to 
the political decisions of Beijing”203. And there are other economic concerns as well: it has been 
estimated that if Japanese overseas trade was forced around Australia, this could increase shipping 
costs with 60 percent.204 
 Nevertheless, bilateral relations with China cannot be strained too much, for the sake of 
stability in the region, which already has to cope with a destabilising factor in the form of North 
Korea. Attempts to add counterweight to the negative sides of the modernisation of the Chinese 
navy can be found mainly in the comments regarding China’s participation in PKO’s, particularly in 
the Gulf of Aden, and regarding its maritime assistance following natural disasters in the region, such 
as the tsunami that hit Japan in 2011. Another example is the Japanese scale back from ‘aggressively’ 
to ‘actively’ when describing the Chinese military modernisation. These ‘balancing acts’, finding the 
middle ground between China and the United States, are also described in the literature: South 
Korea, for example, “requires co-operation […] from both countries in resolving a panoply of salient 
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peninsular issues”.205 Japan’s security relationship with the United States means that it has to tread 
the delicate line between Beijing and Washington, as it seeks to profit from China’s growing 
economy, in spite of growing tensions between China and the U.S. This approach is summed up as “a 
mixture of a managed alliance engaging China on the one hand, and the strengthening of the US-
Japan alliance in case of an unpredictable situation on the other”.206 
 The data in appendix 1 shows that both South Korea and Taiwan have increased the size of 
their fleet since 2005/2006, although in the case of Taiwan this increase is primarily due to a more 
than doubling of its patrol craft, whereas the quantity of the other types has remained relatively 
stable. South Korea has mainly added diesel attack submarines to its fleet, and reduced the number 
of corvettes. This shift from (visible) surface combatants to (less visible) subsurface vessels might 
indicate a desire to improve South Korean deterrence capabilities. The data for Japan shows a 
decrease in overall size of its fleet, which is remarkable and not in line with the rhetoric utilised in the 
white papers. Nevertheless, it has been argued in 2014 that Japan was “belatedly gearing up for a 
long-term maritime competition with China”, shifting its orientation from Russia to the Ryukyu 
Islands, and expanding the size of its submarine fleet,207 the results of which may not yet be fully 
visible in 2018. 
 The next chapter will delve into the defence white papers published by the four southern 
nations located within the first island chain; recurring themes in both chapter 2 and 3 will be 
discussed in the conclusion. 
  
 
                                                          
205 Taeho Kim, ‘South Korea and a Rising China: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects’, in: The China Threat: 
Perceptions, Myths and Reality (London etc. : RoutledgeCurzon 2002) 166–180, 175. 
206 Wenran Jiang, ‘The Japanese Assessment of the “China Threat”’, in: The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths 
and Reality (London etc. : RoutledgeCurzon 2002) 150–165, 161. 
207 Toshi Yoshihara, ‘Troubled Waters: China and Japan Face Off at Sea’, World Affairs 176:5 (2014) 24–30, 29. 
60 
 
Chapter 3 – Perception of the Chinese Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia 
 
This third chapter will continue the examination of the defence white papers, by analysing 
those published by the four nations in the southern half of the first island chain208, i.e. the 
Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, in order to find out how the PLA Navy modernisation, 
and PLA Navy behaviour off the coast of East Asia, is officially perceived. The aforementioned nations 
are all involved in a maritime dispute with China, involving various parts of the South China Sea. 
Again, of each nation, the defence white papers published since December 2004 will be examined, 
looking for references to China or which might be implying China. And, in the case that more than 
one defence white paper has been published since December 2004 and the references to China are 
sufficient enough, whether or not the perception of China by that particular countries has altered 
over time.  
 
The Philippines 
 
The Republic of the Philippines has published only one white paper in the time period since 2004, 
which was made public in 2012. The main theme of that document is the transformation of the 
Department of National Defense (DND), in order to be better capable to respond to national defence 
and security challenges in a fast changing environment. The first strategic objective of the DND is 
securing the territorial integrity and maritime interests of the Philippines, and challenges to that 
objective were categorised as core defence priorities 2013-2018.209 Although China is not referred to 
directly in this white paper, some comments regarding maritime security might implicitly be 
indicating the PRC. With regard to the first strategic objective, concerns have risen about “[h]ow 
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claimant countries will behave in the West Philippine Sea (WPS); […] how perpetrators violate 
Philippine maritime policies and jurisdiction; and, the high state of uncertainty characteri[sing] the 
maritime environment”210. Both the qualifications ‘claimant country’ and ‘perpetrator’ might refer to 
China; the first does for sure, and the latter might be based on events in 2011, when a PLA Navy 
vessel shot at Philippine fishing boats. The Philippines is determined to develop sub-surface warfare 
capabilities, in order to “deter aggression and bullying”.211 Another interesting matter is that the 
Philippines have started referring to the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea after escalating 
tensions about the Spratly Islands in 2011. 
 
Brunei 
 
Since December 2004 Brunei has published only one new defence white paper: in 2011. However, a 
defence white paper update was published in 2007, which was the based on the issue of 2004. It is 
for this reason that the 2004 and 2007 documents will both be discussed as well.  
 None of the Brunei defence white papers does mention China by name. The only comments 
that imply the PRC, are those regarding the situation in the South China Sea. In that conflict, Brunei is 
one of the claimants of a part of the area that China claims as a whole, viz. an EEZ extending 200 
nautical miles from the Bruneian coastline. When discussing its security agenda in 2004, the 
demarcation of maritime boundaries is mentioned as “an issue in bilateral relations between a 
number of regional countries”, the settlement of which is ongoing. 212 The protection of this EEZ is a 
key theme in the Bruneian defence white papers: in 2004 the need to assert sovereignty over the EEZ 
is underlined, and maritime patrols are necessary to demonstrate the resolve of Brunei secure its 
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“extensive maritime interests”.213 In the 2007 update, the protection of the national interests in 
maritime area remained a key objective, and it was advised to upgrade the Bruneian Navy in order to 
be better able to protect those interests.214 The South China Sea issue was analysed in more depth in 
the 2011 issue, than in the two previous issues, probably because of the escalating tensions in the 
area. It was hypothesised that the South China Sea will see more “frequent and extensive 
deployment of maritime forces”215 of major regional powers, which could imply China, or 
alternatively, the U.S., both of which have indeed intensified the amount of patrols in the South 
China Seas in the second decade of the 21st century. This changing security situation and unresolved 
boundary issues ask for a collective regional management, and for a focus on enhancing the 
capabilities of the Bruneian Navy regarding continuous coverage of the maritime area.216 
 Although the defence white papers of Brunei do not mention China by name, it is clear that 
certain measures, such as upgrading and expanding of the Bruneian Navy with new equipment, are 
aimed at reacting on the activities of regional powers (amongst which China can be counted). In 
particular the South China Sea issue is of great importance to Brunei, and (Chinese) developments in 
that area have an impact on the security situation of the country, which makes it strange that no 
stronger objections are posed in the white papers. However, in 2011 China’s activities in the area 
were not as many as they were in 2017. In a new defence white paper, Brunei might object more 
strongly due to the altered security situation, but that remains speculation. 
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Malaysia 
 
The government of Malaysia has published only one defence white paper: in 2012 Malaysia’s 
National Defence Policy was published by the Ministry of Defence. An impetus for releasing this 
document was the changing security environment of Malaysia, with “a number of new challenges 
and uncertainties”.217 And, because different parts of the country are physically separated from each 
other by the South China Sea, this area is of special interest to Malaysia. Malaysia has to defend, and 
to enhance its ability to be able to defend, its maritime areas218, of which a part of the EEZ on the 
eastern side overlaps with the South China Sea claim of China. Malaysia does not see a quick 
resolution to these overlapping claims, because they involve the sovereignty of nations. 
With regard to China, the PRC is seen as emerging “as an economic and military superpower capable 
of influencing the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific as a whole”,219 although the Chinese military 
modernisation is not mentioned, nor is the manner in which China is capable of influencing the 
strategic balance labelled as good or bad. In any case, Malaysia in 2012 recognised the importance of 
establishing defence cooperation with the PRC, which was still ongoing in April 2017.220 
 
Vietnam 
 
The last country that needs to be discussed regarding its official perception of the Chinese naval 
modernisation and the ensuing behaviour in the maritime domain, is the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam. In 2009, the Vietnamese government released its third defence white paper since 1998. 
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Since this is also the only one to be published after December 2004, only this issue will be analysed 
below.  
 Interesting is that Vietnam interprets the changing security environment and the Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA) as entailing a military power competition with the risk of arms races 
“especially at sea and in space”.221 In the Asia-Pacific region, “disputes over territory and natural 
resources in land and at sea have been on the rise”.222 Letting the arms race in space rest for now, it 
is evident that the increased competition for resources at sea and an arms race at sea have a 
correlation. Those actors who possess more (sea)power than their opponents, have a better access 
to the resources necessary to sustain that power. Vietnam claims that the complicated issues in the 
East Sea (i.e. the South China Sea) have had a negative impact on the maritime economic 
development of the country.223 Even though it holds the opinion that “there is sufficient historical 
evidence and legal foundation to prove Vietnam’s undeniable sovereignty over water areas and 
island in the East Sea, including the Paracels and the Spratlys”224, Vietnam is always prepared to 
negotiate with all other countries in the region that want to find a peaceful solution to these issues, 
in accordance with the UNCLOS. To that end, Vietnam urges other parties to restrain themselves, and 
abide by the regulations that have been established.225 China’s claim has the biggest overlap with 
Vietnam’s, so this statement must have been written with at least China in mind, next to Malaysia, 
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Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines. However, the document does not mention Chinese maritime 
behaviour an sich, nor the modernisation efforts within the PLA Navy.  
 
Analysis 
 
Concluding, this third chapter has given an overview of the official perceptions that the nations 
within the first island chain have of the modernisation efforts of the PLA Navy, and the behaviour of 
the Chinese Navy that these modernisations entail, by analysing their respective defence white 
papers. The following section will provide a short analysis of the white papers published by the four 
southern nations. 
It has become evident that there are various ways official perceptions can be brought. 
Contrary to their northern counterparts, the four nations discussed above do not mention the PRC in 
relation to its modernisation efforts at all. Even though no single defence white paper has been 
published later than 2012, and even though Chinese maritime activities have increased significantly 
between 2012 and 2018, it is remarkable that not a word is devoted to the Chinese modernisation 
efforts that have been going on since the early 1990s, considering the impact these have had, and 
still have, on the region. The perception within the four southern countries can thus only be distilled 
from between the lines.  
A conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion above, is that the four southern nations 
approach maritime matters rather individualistic. With the exception of countering piracy, and 
Malaysian-Philippine joint maritime patrols, remarks that concern maritime security cooperation are 
surprisingly absent. To be sure, (defence) cooperation in general, primarily between the ASEAN 
members, is mentioned, but very few of these comments provide a practical plan of action to resolve 
maritime disputes together. The southern nations do not seem to be looking for allies in resolving 
their conflicts, nor do the claimant countries in the South China Sea conflict make a fist together 
against China. Perhaps (and this is a topic that will come back in the conclusion) the explanation for 
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this phenomenon lies below the bottom of the South China Sea, which supposedly is rich in natural 
resources such as gas and oil. These natural resources are so important to the development of a 
nation, that each country will do its utmost best to secure the maritime areas they claim. And given 
that these claims not only overlap with China’s, but also with each other, cooperation is not a 
popular option. Indeed, Sam Bateman, who is a Professorial Research Fellow at the Australian 
National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) at the University of Wollongong in 
Australia, argues that it is “unconceivable” that the ASEAN as a whole would be involved in a conflict 
with China, because it is not in the first place a security organisation, nor do all members have an 
equal threat-perception of China.226 It is not even the case that all ten ASEAN members have a 
territorial conflict with China, and moreover, China is very explicit about the fact that it does not 
want to multilaterally resolve sovereignty issues. These can only be addressed on a bilateral basis, 
according to China.  
On top of that, two other explanations for this individualism can be distilled from a 2013 
article on China’s behaviour in the South China Sea by Michael Yahuda, Professor Emeritus of 
International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The first is that “the 
smaller countries understandably fear being overwhelmed by their giant neighbor”227, given that no 
agreement exists on how to settle sovereignty issues within the UNCLOS framework. If taken to be 
referring to military power, the Chinese defence budget is bigger than the combined defence 
budgets of the ASEAN countries, which may well add to this fear. Yahuda finds a second explanation 
in the relationship between the United States and China. Despite American willingness to address the 
disputes, and be a counter-balance to China’s power, the ASEAN nations have their doubts about 
U.S. ability and willingness to commit to the long term, nor do they want to be involved in a potential 
struggle for power between China and the United States. On top of that, “[a]ll their economies are 
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tied to China and they do not wish to antagonize their giant neighbor unduly by openly siding with 
the US”228. Indeed, between 2012 and 2016, according to the World Bank, China was an important 
trading partner of each of these countries, accounting for 10,43% to 29,82% of the imports of the 
respective countries, and for a considerable share of their exports.229 So, it might have been for 
economic reasons that these countries have not wanted to antagonise such an important trading 
partner of theirs. It is true that China is also an important trading partner of South Korea and Japan, 
but those economies are larger than their Southeast Asian counterparts, and more able to balance 
their trade with China. As a result of their shared history, Taiwan has such a unique position vis-à-vis 
China, that it considers it almost its duty to explicitly point out China’s behaviour in the South China 
Sea. As such, the white papers confirm the conclusions that have been drawn in the literature 
regarding security cooperation in East Asia. 
Another explanation for the relative taciturnity of the southern nations regarding the PLAN 
developments may be found in the data shown in appendix 1. Compared with their northern 
counterparts, the naval assets of the four southern nations are no match at all for the PLA Navy. 
Their fleets mainly consists of patrol craft, and only Vietnam’s naval power has increased 
substantially since 2005/2006. Their (lack of) naval power in mind, these nations might not have 
wanted to unduly antagonise their (significantly) more powerful neighbour. 
It can be concluded from the analyses of chapters 2 and 3, that there are various ways to 
cope with a modernising Chinese navy. This ranges from openly and frequently stating in the official 
deliberations that China is a threat to regional stability, to not mentioning the PRC at all, and only 
implying its involvement. In the conclusion the themes that have arisen from these analyses will be 
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delved into. The next chapter will turn to the perception of the Chinese naval modernisation in the 
United States of America. 
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Chapter 4 – Perception of the Chinese Naval Modernisation in U.S. Government 
Report 
 
There is one country that cannot be left out of this study, because its name keeps coming up in the 
defence white papers of the countries that have been studied before, and because of its presence in 
the region: the United States. The United States is heavily present in the Asia-Pacific region, with 
military bases in South Korea and Japan, a sustained naval presence in the South China Sea, and 
bases on Guam, which is located in the second island chain.230 In fact, Robert Kaplan, who is a 
member of the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) Defense Policy Board, argues that all nine states 
around the South China Sea are arrayed against China because of the nine-dash-line claim, and 
therefore are “dependent on the United States for diplomatic and military support”.231 Next to that, 
the development of China’s presence on the international stage since 1978, which according to 
Kristof was to become the “behemoth in the neighborhood”232, poses a challenge to the power of 
that other behemoth on the world stage, the U.S. It is thus necessary to analyse how the current 
most powerful nation of the world publically perceives a possible threat to its power. 
 The U.S. does not specifically publish defence white papers. It did however, publish similar 
documents, such as a National Defense Strategy in 2008, strategic guidance for the DoD in 2012, and 
a Quadrennial Defense Review in 2006, 2010, and 2014. Even so, the literal references to China in 
these combined documents, amount to only 50. Next to that, whereas the seven nations studied 
above are located in the first island chain, close to China, the U.S. is not. Moreover, the Pacific Ocean 
functions as a buffer zone between both countries. Given its relatively far-away geographic position 
from China, its defence white papers will not necessarily predominantly be focussed on China. Which 
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may be the reason for the low amount of references to China in the papers that have just been 
mentioned.  
 That is why, in order to study the U.S. official perception of the Chinese naval modernisation, 
this study will make use of a report to Congress by the U.S. DoD, titled “Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017”.233 Not only is this report more recently 
dated than the National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Reviews, it also specifically 
studies the subject of this study. It addresses “the current and probable future course of military-
technological development of the People’s Liberation Army”, which includes the PLAN, and discusses 
the development over the next twenty years of China’s security strategy and military strategy and its 
background, as well as its relation with the United States.234 The report will be analysed for 
references to the PLA Navy modernisation, thus providing the official perception of the U.S. 
government of this issue. 
 
China Military Power Report 
 
One of the prime elements to be highlighted in the report, as a part of the analysis of the PLA’s 
concept of military strategy, is the Army’s growing emphasis on the maritime theatre. In that respect, 
it is mentioned that this emphasis is interpreted by regional analysts as “an indication that China 
expect significant elements of a modern conflict to occur at sea”,235 which becomes evident in the 
role of the PLAN in China’s growing global presence, and its behaviour in advancing Chinese interests. 
“Tactics short of armed conflict”, “activities calculated to fall below the threshold of provoking […]”, 
and a “newfound willingness to exercise [China’s] capacity to strengthen China’s control over 
disputed areas, enhance China’s presence, and challenge other claimants” are a few of the phrases 
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used to describe that behaviour.236 The report does not only describe PLA(N) behaviour in the various 
maritime disputes as coercive, it also gives a hint at a possible incentive by mentioning “ownership of 
potentially rich offshore oil and gas deposits” as a factor in these disputes.237 Another factor is put 
forward in relation to China’s energy strategy. As a net importer of e.g. oil and gas, China is heavily 
dependent on sea lines of communications (SLOCs) that are unimpeded, in order to provide in its 
needs to sustain its economic growth.238  
 Coupled with these assertive efforts in handling its claims, are forceful rhetoric and a lack of 
transparency. Together, according to the U.S., this behaviour is likely to increasingly incite concerns 
inside and outside the Asia-Pacific region. China’s naval power projection capabilities, in e.g. 
peacetime operations, are increasing, and deemed to rival U.S. military superiority. The U.S. 
however, points out some “key obstacles” to performing this power projection in distant areas, i.e. 
logistics and intelligence support.239 On the other hand, the considerable enlargement and 
modernisation of the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the deployment of the China Maritime Militia 
(CMM) in e.g. the South China Sea, are seen as improving China’s ability to enforce its claims in the 
maritime theatre.240 The first is said to be deployed in the foreground of maritime disputes, with the 
PLAN watching in the background in case of contingencies. It is not specified in the document in what 
ways the CCG is deployed, but it can be assumed that manoeuvring in and out of contested waters is 
the intended style. The latter, the CMM, is an armed civilian reserve force, and is said to play a major 
role in the Chinese coercive behaviour in the South China Sea. Various examples are provided, such 
as the 2012 Scarborough Reef standoff, in which tensions arose between the Philippines and China 
over Chinese fishing vessels near Scarborough Reef being inspected by the Philippine Navy, and the 
arrest of the fishermen being blocked by Chinese maritime surveillance ships. Regarding power 
projection, it is remarkable that the Chinese aircraft carrier is said not to be as capable as the U.S. 
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Navy’s Nimitz-class carriers in projecting power, primarily because of its smaller size. Its potential to 
serve as a ‘training’ vessel for future carriers, on the other hand, is acknowledged.241  
 The modernisation of the Chinese navy is discussed in the context of the PLA modernisation 
in general. Technological and organisational modernisation have had a positive influence on the 
flexibility and responsiveness of the PLA. For the PLA Navy, this means e.g. the construction of Jin-
class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which can be equipped with ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs), serving as a sea-based nuclear deterrence force. It is called to attention that the 
focus of the modernisation is on quality, rather than on quantity, by replacing older vessels with 
more advanced ones.242 The 2015-16 additions to the fleet are discussed in depth, as well as 
estimates of future developments, signalling that the U.S. keeps a close eye on these developments. 
That also includes an assessment of the resources used for military modernisation. Next to China’s 
considerable fiscal investments, domestic research and development (R&D), and acquisition of 
foreign technology, the U.S. also accuses China of state-sponsored technical and industrial espionage 
to further the modernisation of its military.243  
 Moreover, the U.S. regards the Chinese force modernisation as a preparation for a ‘Taiwan 
contingency’, an escalation of the status quo between China and Taiwan. Even though this is not 
surprising since it is official Chinese policy, it is the ambiguity of China’s red lines that must be 
crossed before China will use military force that is the greatest uncertainty in this conflict. This 
ambiguity “preserves China’s flexibility”, assumedly to always be able to justify its actions against 
Taiwan.244 Various possible campaigns for China to seize Taiwan are discussed in the document, 
many of which include the PLA Navy, in e.g. a maritime blockade of Taiwan, seizure of its offshore 
islands, and an amphibious invasion. Although, a large-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan is seen as 
a political and military risk, since the PLA is deemed to be “capable of accomplishing various 
                                                          
241 Ibid., 26. 
242 Ibid., 24. 
243 Ibid., 65–72. 
244 Ibid., 75. 
73 
 
amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan”. The modernisation is primarily seen 
as improving the PLA’s ability to conduct complex joint operations, as a Taiwan contingency would 
certainly be, and at the same time as a means to deter any potential third party. 245 With this ‘third 
party’, the U.S. probably has itself in mind.  
 With regard to military cooperation, the U.S. perceives China’s military modernisation to 
have both opportunities and challenges. Deeper practical cooperation will be possible as the PLA’s 
military capabilities grow, but the risk of a miscalculation on any scale, or an accident, will increase 
with the same speed.246 Nevertheless, it is the goal of the U.S. Defense Department to pursue a 
constructive relationship with China in the Asia-Pacific region. The development of this relationship is 
important in two ways. In the first place, the U.S. will strengthen this relationship with China to best 
serve its own interests, and the interests of its allies and partners. It is this comment that reassures 
the allies and partners of the U.S., such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, to know 
themselves to be backed against China by the United States. Other than the security alliance, 
defence treaties, and relations act that have been signed with these countries, which had defence 
against any adversary in mind, this comment is specifically written with regard to China. In the 
second place, the U.S. aims with this relationship to ensure “that China acts in a manner consistent 
with international laws and norms and that China serves as a source of stability and shared 
prosperity in Asia”. Implicitly, the United States declares here that China has the potential to act in a 
manner that is not consistent with international laws and norms. And perhaps, that China currently 
displays behaviour that is not in line with international regulation. So, the United States are trying 
here to keep an eye on the developments within the Chinese army, and at the same time to point out 
to China the responsibility it has as a major regional power, and to act accordingly. The military 
positioning vis-à-vis China of the U.S. is summarised in the following paragraph: 
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“As the United States builds a stronger foundation for a military-to-military relationship with China, it 
will continue to monitor China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development, and will 
encourage China to be more transparent about its military modernization program. The United States 
also will continue adapting its forces, posture, and operational concepts to deter aggression, defend its 
allies, and ensure it continues to engage China from a position of strength. The United States will 
continue to build the capacity of its allies and partners, enhance regional cooperation, and deepen 
partnerships to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment.”247 
An example of this relationship is the Chinese participation in the 2016 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 
exercise, the largest international maritime warfare exercise in the world, in which vessels, 
equipment, and staff of more than twenty nations take part.248 Other examples of 2016 are meetings 
between the then-naval commanders of both nations and reciprocal port calls. 
 
Analysis 
 
The first sign that the United States are taking China’s military modernisation efforts seriously, is the 
fact that the report that has been studied above is the only one of its kind. No other report that has 
been published by the DoD about any country aims at providing Congress with such a detailed 
account of that nation’s military strength and development as does this document. This signals that 
the U.S. regards China as one of the competitors, and possibly the most important competitor, for its 
position on the world stage. To that end, the document specifically analysed probable future courses 
of the Chinese modernisation efforts, which became visible in for example the discussion of types of 
weapons and equipment China is developing and the effect these might have on the capabilities of 
the PLA, inside and outside of China. In this, even though the report itself does not make reference to 
the historiography, it takes a nuanced position in the debate about whether or not China’s rise will 
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be peaceful. It carefully weighs the opportunities, as well as the threat that emerges from China’s 
military modernisation. As such, it follows the recommendation of Holmes and Yoshihara, who 
concluded that the Chinese developments will elude “diametrically opposed projections”, and that 
“[p]reparing for ambiguity and the middle ground between brown- and blue-water scenarios should 
be the focus of naval planning in the Pentagon”.249  
 Another sign is the lengthy discussion of the modernisation itself. Each division of the PLA, 
such as the air force, navy, and ground forces, (even though the focus, as said before, is on the naval 
development) is analysed in light of the developments that have taken place within those divisions. 
The implications for the United States of these developments, in particular China’s nuclear and naval 
capabilities, are perceived as potentially able to destabilise the position of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific 
region. In this, the report fundamentally deviates from the opinion of various observers, including 
Robert Ross, an associate at the Fairbank Centre for Chinese Studies of Harvard University. He argues 
that the U.S. is already unable to compete with China for maritime influence in East Asia, and that 
regional stability is already undermined by China’s increasing naval power, because of budgetary and 
institutional constraints to U.S. Navy shipbuilding capabilities, whereas the Chinese shipbuilding 
capabilities have increased significantly, leading to a shift in the balance of power. According to his 
view, the report should have a very different perception of the status quo of the balance of (naval) 
power in the Asia-Pacific region and, instead of proposing how to balance the rise of China based on 
“outdated notions of U.S. pre-eminence”, the report should have proposed how the U.S. has “to 
adjust to the new balance of power in East Asia”.250 
 On the other hand, the modernisation itself is regarded as providing opportunities for deeper 
military cooperation, even though some caution must be taken to minimise the risk of 
miscalculations and miscommunications that might lead to tensions between both countries. But 
that only concerns the updated equipment itself, as used by the PLA (Navy). The perception of the 
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Chinese behaviour that accompanies the modernisation, as displayed in e.g. the South China Sea, 
concerns the U.S. This behaviour is deemed not to be according to international laws, regulations and 
norms, and to be assertive and coercive, only to further Chinese interests. As such, it is seen as a 
destabilising factor to the political stability of the region. The fact that the military behaviour is 
accompanied by forceful governmental rhetoric and a lack of transparency regarding e.g. defence 
spending, does not contribute positively to this perception. Indeed, Bergsten et al. argued that the 
difference between the Chinese economic growth and military modernisation is not the speed of its 
development, but rather the transparency that surrounds it. Military modernisation is much less 
visible to outsiders, which poses a challenge to “America’s role as guarantor of security in Asia”.251 
 In short, the United States in this report take a nuanced position in view of the literature on 
the Chinese naval modernisation, which sketched on the one hand the opportunities, and on the 
other hand the possible threat of this development.  
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 Conclusion – Recurring Themes and Concluding Remarks  
 
In the previous four chapters the situation concerning the modernisation of the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) has been analysed, from both the viewpoint of the Chinese defence white papers 
and the viewpoints of those nations geographically situated within the first island chain, as brought 
forward in their respective defence white papers, complemented with the view of the United States. 
The first chapter has shortly analysed the Chinese naval history that formed the basis for the naval 
modernisation efforts that are taking place in especially the 21st century. These efforts were then 
discussed, in light of the national security strategy behind them, in order to provide context to the 
analysis of Chinese behaviour in maritime matters. Behaviour that, in the Yellow, East China, and 
South China Seas, was found to be the result of a more and more outward looking maritime strategy, 
changing from purely defensive to offshore defence in combination with open seas protection. 
China’s ambitions within the first island chain have for a great extent been realised, and the current 
maritime strategy is in line with the Chinese ambitions within the second island chain, and eventual 
global aspirations. These ambitions require a greater presence of Chinese naval vessels in the 
maritime areas, increasing the possibility of behaviour vis-à-vis other nations present in those areas, 
that can be labelled as assertive, a few examples of which have been provided at the conclusion of 
the first chapter. 
 In the second and third chapters, the official perception of Chinese behaviour in the maritime 
area of the nations within the first island chain has been discussed by analysing their respective 
defence white papers, whereas this has been done in the fourth chapter for the U.S. with a report 
that analysed China’s military power and its implications for the U.S. Recurring themes will be 
discussed in light of the existing literature, thus arriving at an answer to the question how the  official 
regional perception of China’s naval modernisation contributes to the debate on the nature of 
China’s development, and providing a nuanced view to the advocated peacefulness of that 
development. 
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Themes 
 
South China Sea 
 
The main recurring theme in the sections regarding maritime affairs in the defence white papers, is 
not the PRC itself, but the South China Sea conflict as a whole. Even though some nations do not 
mention China at all, this conflict is part of every country’s deliberations. Especially the claimant 
countries, but also South Korea and Japan, keep a close eye on the developments in the South China 
Sea. As has been discussed in chapter 2, South Korea mentioned it as an example of a regional 
conflict involving territorial claims and of Beijing neglecting international law. Japan has similar 
worries about the Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Of the claimant countries, however, 
Taiwan is the only one that mentions China directly in relation to its behaviour in the South China 
Sea. Interestingly enough, the others do not. All of them do mention the issues in the South China 
Sea (or national equivalents of the name), but neither the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, nor Vietnam 
mention specific Chinese activities such as land reclamation. This may in part be attributed to the fact 
that their respective white papers all have been published before or in 2012 (when the Chinese 
activities were not at the level they are at in 2017 and 2018, even though tensions were already 
escalating in 2011 and 2012), or to the tight links their respective economies have with China’s. 
Even so, given the fact that the South China Sea issue is of great importance to each nation 
involved, this conflict can be regarded as an indicator of regional political stability. This is also proven 
by the importance the U.S. attaches to this dispute. In the studied report, it becomes clear that the 
behaviour of the Chinese navy in the South China Sea is regarded as indicative of China’s naval 
capabilities. In other words, the United States regards the South China Sea as a case study of what 
will happen in the Pan-Pacific area, or globally, when China expands its capabilities even further. 
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North/South Dichotomy 
 
A theme that is related to the theme discussed in the paragraph above, is the dichotomy between 
the three northern countries, and the four southern ones. On every issue regarding China, the 
northern countries are more outspoken than their southern counterparts. In the first place, in the 
studied time period since December 2004, the northern nations have published all together twenty-
five defence white papers with regular intervals, whereas the southern nations have published only 
seven252, and none since 2013. So, the northern nations make good use of this regular opportunity to 
react to recent developments, and the southern nations do not. In the second place, contrary to the 
southern nations, the northern nations actually point out in what way(s) China’s behaviour diverges 
from their, or international, standards. These examples range from incidents on sea, such as the 2004 
submarine incident in Japanese waters, to large scale naval exercises, such as the 2017 Chinese seal-
off of part of the Yellow Sea. There is not just one single reason behind this dichotomy, but it is the 
result of a mix of political and economic reasons, such as the relative dependency of the country’s 
economy on China, the struggle for power between the U.S. and China in the region, and the non-
military nature of ASEAN. 
 
Natural Resources 
 
A third theme that emerges from the defence white papers, are the natural resources below the 
surface of the sea, especially oil and gas. Related to this theme are the disputes about the Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) and Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the maritime theatre. The 
availability of natural resources is an important factor for the growth of the economy of a country.253 
They can be imported, but that has its costs. Having it at your disposal, because the resources are 
found within your own territory, saves capital, and it makes countries less dependent on other 
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nations. So, from that viewpoint the disputes about South China Sea and other areas, which 
supposedly are rich in natural resources, are understandable. As are China’s claims: the PRC’s need 
for natural resources has grown exponentially since its opening up in 1978. The other nations worry 
about those claims, and the behaviour that they involve. Another aspect of this theme is the 
dependency of the studied nations on SLOCs, for the import of the natural resources that they need 
for the growth of their economy. Primarily the northern countries, but to a lesser extent also the 
southern nations, regard China’s behaviour as threatening to an unimpeded transport of resources 
along these SLOCs.  
 
Legal framework 
 
Throughout the various white papers neighbouring nations repeatedly urge China to abide by 
international regulation. These comments however, remain rather generic, which might be due to 
the lack of a legal framework to resolve the South China Sea maritime disputes. Even though China is 
a party to UNCLOS, and thus legally bound by its provisions, the convention does not provide the 
means to resolve these disputes definitively, because of various exclusions of legal disputes from this 
binding dispute settlement framework. As such, China has been able to disregard international 
rulings such as the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague, which could not rule over sovereignty issues and boundary demarcation, although it has ruled 
out the legality of China’s nine-dash claim.  
This disregard for international regulation gives the wrong signal to China’s neighbours, and 
does not contribute positively to the perception of the peacefulness of China’s development. The 
desire expressed in the white papers for China to comply with the norms is proof of that. 
Nevertheless, the white papers withhold the fact that the disputes would be clarified a great deal if 
all (and not only China) claimant states conform their claims to the UNCLOS provisions. “This would 
then clarify which areas of the South China Sea are in dispute, and which are not […]. This would set 
the stage for serious discussion on setting aside the sovereignty disputes and jointly developing the 
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resources in the areas in dispute”.254 Resolving the disputes in the South China Sea is the 
responsibility of all claimant states. 
 
Transparency 
 
Very prominent in the discussion of the Chinese military developments is the lack of transparency 
regarding military spending and lack of explanation regarding the military decision making process.255 
The lack of transparency creates uncertainty within the leadership of great powers such as Japan and 
the United States about China’s capabilities, but even more so by China’s smaller neighbours, as is 
added by Yahuda, since “they are the first to feel the brunt of China’s growing military power”.256 It is 
peculiar that his observation is not substantiated by the studied defence white papers: these confirm 
the former, but not the latter. The concern about this issue is only found in the Japanese and 
American documents. None of the other studied nations have made a reference to transparency in 
the context of China’s military modernisation. Perhaps the explanation is again to be found in those 
countries not willing to unduly antagonise their bigger neighbour. 
 On the other hand however, it is also argued that greater transparency on China’s side “is not 
necessarily a positive indicator of peaceful intentions and acceptance of the US-led world order. 
Instead […] the more likely explanation is that China is confident in its relative power and hopes to 
show its strength to coerce or deter”.257 This greater transparency has not yet happened, but it might 
be a possibility for the (near) future. As for now, the intention of China’s actions to consolidate 
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maritime power in the South China Sea, e.g. land reclamation to build military bases and airstrips, are 
clouded by the same opacity, which is a theme that comes back in the white papers. A Chinese 
scholar however, Zhou Fangyin258, has argued that the “firm approach” China displays in this regard, 
i.e. the scale, speed, and show of capability, has actually helped reduce tensions and uncertainty. The 
Chinese approach left little room for regional counter-measures, which would have extended the 
duration of the disputes even further, and have resulted in greater uncertainty.259 This is not a 
conclusion that is underlined by the studied white papers. 
 
Cooperation 
 
 A prominent theme that is lacking in the white papers, as has been brought forward in the analyses 
of the previous chapters, is the (regional) security cooperation. Whereas in 1994 China’s threat to the 
South China Sea was put away as “illusory”, because of a trend towards military cooperation within 
ASEAN, and the “economic star status” of several of its members, which would generate 
international protests and assistance in the case of a conflict,260 little evidence of this cooperation 
has been found in the documents studied above. Because the situation has changed fundamentally 
since this 1994 assessment, it underlines the importance of continuous attention to military 
developments in the region, and to be aware of their unpredictable nature. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Throughout this study, it has been reiterated several times that, in analysing the question of the 
nature of China’s rise being peaceful or not, the verdict will not be that its nature is either peaceful or 
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threatening, as some have proposed.261 By studying the perception of China’s naval modernisation in 
the defence white papers of regional actors since 2004, this study has let those speak that are first 
and most affected by the development of this nature. Coupled with the shifting primary focus of the 
Chinese security attention from land to sea, thus diverging from a historical trend, which has had a 
significant impact on the security situation of the region, and given that it is China’s explicit intention 
for its rise to be perceived as peaceful, their reactions to this modernisation are a prime indicator of 
the success of China’s intentions. In that regard, it is telling that the shift from “threat” to 
“responsibility” that is visible in the debate on China’s rise, is non-existent in the white papers. 
 Taken together, the white papers (backed up by the data in appendix 1) provide a nuanced 
view to the peacefulness of China’s rise as it is advocated by China itself, but also to the 
apprehensiveness of the “China threat theory”. As such, they sometimes bring up themes 
contradicting the existing literature on the subject. The different reactions to Chinese naval 
developments and behaviour, ranging from silence to expressions of concern and discontent, prove 
the complexity of assessing the nature of China’s rise. Nevertheless, even though every actor’s 
reaction is rooted in its own military, political, economic, and historical circumstances, their 
similarities and differences have presented handles in the form of important themes with which this 
complexity can be made more comprehensible, as did the development over time of their reactions. 
 These themes point at an unsteady regional security situation, and an increasing caution 
towards China’s rise. However, they also point to the fact that this situation is not entirely indebted 
to Chinese developments. Undoubtedly China’s lack of transparency, disdain for international rulings, 
and assertive naval behaviour do not contribute positively to the perception of a peaceful rise, but 
several other factors influencing this perception have their roots outside of China, in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Firstly, not addressing challenges to a nation’s security situation such as China’s naval 
modernisation, or not regularly publishing a written update on the assessment of the security 
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situation, does not help to alleviate these challenges. Secondly, the competition for natural resources 
poses a burden on the regional security situation, by making nations display egoistical behaviour, 
which increases tensions between nations, in particular between China as the biggest consumer in 
the region and its smaller neighbours. Thirdly, the lack of attention to regional security cooperation 
in the white papers, may create insecurity about the widening gap in military capabilities between 
China and the other regional actors, thus negatively influencing the perception of China. And lastly, 
the lack of a legal international framework to resolve maritime disputes definitely, does not inspire 
confidence in a quick resolution to these disputes. The increasing caution in the region towards 
China’s rise is thus the result of Chinese, regional, as well as international factors, even though it is 
not perceived as inherently threatening as it has been suggested by proponents of the “China threat 
theory”.  
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